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INTRODUCTION: AN OUTMODED LEGAL PARADIGM 
Others say, Law is our Fate; 
Others say, Law is our State; 
Others say, others say 
Law is no more, 
Law has gone away. 
Both international and domestic law take as a basic premise the 
notion that it is possible, important, and usually fairly straightforward 
to distinguish between war and peace, emergencies and normality, the 
foreign and the domestic, the external and the internal. From an in- 
ternational law perspective, the law of armed conflict2 is triggered only 
when an armed conflict actually exists;" the rest of the time, other 
bodies of law are applicable.4 Domestically, U.S. courts have devel- 
oped a constitutional and statutory jurisprudence that attempts to dis- 
tinguish between "national security" issues and "domestic" questions, 
with the courts subjecting government actions to far less scrutiny when 
those actions are taken in the name of national security.5 
W.H. AUDEN, Law like Love, in COLLECTED POEMS 262, 263 (Edward Mendelson 
ed., 1991). 
2 There is some debate about the most appropriate term for the body of custom- 
ary and treaty-based law that deals with armed conflict, but throughout this Article I 
use the phrase the "law of armed conflict" as the most inclusive and widely accepted 
term. The "law of war" and "international humanitarian law" are both often used in- 
terchangeably with the "law of armed conflict," but at times I use each of these terms in 
a narrower sense. 
The law of armed conflict is "lex specialis," applying only to situations of armed 
conflict, but trumping other legal regimes during periods of armed conflict. 
4 See, e.g., Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 355, 375 (2002) (asserting that "the law of war limits state action in 
periods of conflict and human rights law limits state behavior in periods of peace" 
(footnote omitted)). 
5 See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786-87 (1950) (holding that the 
courts have no power of judicial review over decisions of military tribunals adjudicating 
the offenses of enemy aliens during wartime); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (vesting the federal government with the power neces- 
sary "to maintain an effective control of international relations"); see also WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 222 (1998) ("In any 
civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper balance between free- 
dom and order. In wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance shifts to 
some degree in favor of order-- . .. the government's ability to deal with conditions 
that threaten the national well-being."). 
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This Article asserts that these binary distinctions are no longer 
tenable. In almost every sphere, globalization has complicated once- 
straightforward legal categories, but this is nowhere more apparent 
and more troubling than in the realms of armed conflict and national 
security law. Although the boundaries between "war" and "nonwar," 
and between "national security" and "domestic issues," have been 
eroding for some time, September 11 and its aftermath have high- 
lighted the increasing incoherence and irrelevance of these tradi- 
tional legal categories. Shifts in the nature of security threats have 
broken down once clear distinctions between armed conflict and "in- 
ternal disturbances" that do not rise to the level of armed conflict; be- 
tween states and nonstate actors; between combatants and noncom- 
batants; between spatial zones in which conflict is occurring and zones 
in which conflict is not occurring; between temporal moments in 
which there is no conflict and temporal moments in which there is 
conflict; and between matters that clearly affect the security of the na- 
tion and matters that clearly do not. 
The breakdown of these once reasonably straightforward distinc- 
tions gave the U.S. government an opening to argue, among other 
things, that noncitizen detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba may 
be detained indefinitely without charge;" that U.S. citizens (including 
those detained inside the U.S.) may be designated "unlawful combat- 
ants" by executive fiat and held indefinitely without charge or access 
to attorneys;' and that the U.S. may kill any suspected terrorist in any 
6 See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Announces Draft De- 
tainee Review Policy (Mar. 3, 2004) ("[T] he law of war permits the detention of enemy 
combatants for the duration of the conflict. It permits this detention without the use 
of a review process."), available at http://www.dod.gov/releases/2004/nr20040303- 
0403.html; see also Richard J. Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay: The In- 
ter-American Commission on Human Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole", 10 HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF 2, 2 (2003) (noting that "the U.S. government continues to argue that the nearly 
650 detainees from an estimated 40 nations are not entitled to any of the legal protec- 
tions of U.S. domestic law or international human rights law"). 
7 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2636 (2004) ("The Government 
contends that Hamdi is an 'enemy combatant,' and that this status justifies holding 
him in the United States indefinitely---without formal charges or proceedings-unless 
and until it makes the determination that access to counsel or further process is war- 
ranted."). See generally Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or 
"Prisoners Of War": The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59 (2003); 
Christopher M. Evans, Note, Terrorism on Trial: The President's Constitutional Authority to 
Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission, 51 DUKE L.J. 1831 
(2002); Anne English French, Note, Trials in Times of War: Do the Bush Military Commis- 
sions Sacrifice Our Freedoms?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225 (2002); Thomas J. Lepri, Note, Safi- 
guarding the Enemy Within: The Need for Procedural Protections for U.S. Citizens Detained as 
Enemy Combatants Under Ex Parte Quirin, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565 (2003); Robert K. 
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state in the world at any time.8 U.S. courts are currently struggling to 
determine how to assess many of these claims," all of which are based 
on loose, but not implausible, readings of the law of armed conflict.10 
Goldman & Brian D. Tittemore, Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Af- 
ghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human 
Rights Law (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.asil.org/ 
taskforce/goldman.pdf. 
See, e.g., Goldman & Tittemore, supra note 7, at 24 (citing President Bush's 
statement that while the United States has an "enduring commitment to the important 
principles of the [Third] Geneva Convention, .... the war on terrorism is a war not en- 
visioned when the Geneva Convention was signed in 1949" and that the Geneva Con- 
ventions "simply [do] not cover every situation in which people may be captured or 
detained, as we see in Afghanistan today" (alterations in original, omission added)); see 
also Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, White House Office of the Press Sec'y 
(Feb. 7, 2002) (stating the government's position that the Geneva Conventions apply 
only to Taliban detainees, not al Qaida detainees, but that "[t]he United States is treat- 
ing and will continue to treat all of the individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely 
and, to the extent, appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner con- 
sistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949"), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html. Consider 
also the U.S. government's defense of the 2002 missile attack on suspected al Qaeda 
members in Yemen. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice later defended the 
attack, saying, "[t]he president has given broad authority to U.S. officials in a variety of 
circumstances to do what they need to do to protect the country." Interview with Con- 
doleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, by Tony Snow, Fox News Sunday (Fox News 
television broadcast, Nov. 10, 2002) (transcript available at http:// 
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,69783,00.html). Rice has also asserted that "[w]e're 
in a new kind of war, and we've made very clear that it is important that this new kind 
of war be fought on different battlefields" and that "no constitutional questions are 
raised here.... [The killing was] well within the bounds of accepted practice . 
Howard Witt, U.S.: Killing of al Qaeda Suspects Was Lawful, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 2002, at 1. 
9 See e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2721-22 (2004) (holding that the 
commander of the naval brig where an alleged "enemy combatant" was held is a 
proper respondent to the habeas petition); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004) 
(stating that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the habeas challenges of "enemy 
combatants" held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635 (holding that 
due process requires that a U.S. citizen detained in the United States as an "enemy 
combatant" must "be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for 
that detention"). 
10 Arguments for preemptive self-defense, which were also invoked in the context 
of the 2002 U.S. attack in Yemen, also rely on Article 2(4) of the United Nations Char- 
ter. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 ("Members shall refrain ... from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."). 
Bush administration lawyers also sought to use the increasing blurriness of law of 
armed conflict legal categories to assert that detainees in the war on terror could be 
subjected to harsh interrogation techniques, some of which constitute torture in the 
opinion of many outside legal experts. Unlike the various other administration argu- 
ments discussed above, which rest on loose but plausible readings of the law of armed 
conflict, the argument that harsh interrogation techniques are permissible for sus- 
pected terrorists is disingenuous. Regardless of which legal paradigm one chooses to 
invoke (criminal law, the law of armed conflict, human rights law, etc.), and regardless 
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In response to these arguments, many in the human rights, civil 
rights, and international law communities have struggled to insist on 
the continuing viability of the law of armed conflict's traditional 
boundaries," since the erosion of these boundaries has had (and will 
of how one categorizes detainees (as POWs, unlawful comabatants, criminals, civilians, 
etc.), the minimum standards concerning humane treatment are essentially the same. 
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibits "cruel treatment 
and torture," as well as "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment." Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condidition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32-34 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Ship- 
wrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 
3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86-88 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Con- 
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136-38 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Ge- 
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288-90 [hereinafter Fourth 
Geneva Convention] (I will refer to these conventions collectively as the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions). The Third Geneva Convention (on POWs) contains even stronger pro- 
hibitions, as does the Fourth Geneva Convention (on civilians). See Third Geneva 
Convention, supra, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40; Fourth Geneva 
Convention, supra, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290. The United States has 
also ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, at 19 
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention 
Against Torture], and Congress has passed implementing legislation making torture a 
federal crime, 18 U.S.C. ?? 2340-2340A (2000). 
Around the world, numerous courts (including the European Court of Human 
Rights) have fleshed out the meaning of terms such as torture and cruel or inhumane 
treatment, and there can be no serious disagreement that many of the Pentagon's ap- 
proved interrogation techniques run afoul of international standards. See, e.g., Ilascu v. 
Moldova, App. No. 48787/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 2004) (applying case law in ruling 
on allegations of torture), available at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
11 See generally LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: 
LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES (2003) (arguing 
that executive orders have bypassed independent judicial review and thus violate the 
principles of the rule of law); WILLIAM F. SCHULZ, TAINTED LEGACY: 9/11 AND THE 
RUIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2003) (maintaining that current international human rights 
policy is sufficient protection of our security and need not be violated as it has been 
during the war on terror); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding 
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that the Presi- 
dent does not have the power to unilaterally establish military tribunals because the 
Constitution prohibits the executive from defining a state of war without a congres- 
sional declaration); Anthony Lewis, Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 
257 (maintaining that the executive power should not override constitutional rights in 
the undeclared war on terror); Kenneth Roth, Human Rights, the Bush Administration, 
and the Fight Against Terrorism: The Need for a Positive Vision, in LOST LIBERTIES: 
ASHCROFT AND THE ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM 237 (Cynthia Brown ed., 2003) 
(arguing that the United States' war on terrorism ignores and violates internationally 
accepted human rights protections); David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent 
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almost certainly continue to have) a disastrous effect on basic rights 
and vulnerable populations."1 Many in these communities have in- 
sisted, for instance, that the law of armed conflict should be inter- 
preted in a strict and formalistic manner when it comes to evaluating 
U.S. actions in the "war on terror,"'3 and some human rights groups 
(including Amnesty International) have asserted that since al Qaeda is 
neither a state nor a domestic insurgent group, the law of armed con- 
flict does not apply at all to the U.S. struggle against terrorism,"4 which 
should be governed instead by the principles of domestic and interna- 
tional criminal law. 
It is somewhat ironic for any in the human rights law community 
to insist on a rigid and traditional reading of the law of armed conflict 
when it comes to the war on terror, since in many other contexts the 
human rights community has appropriately been at the forefront of 
calls for progressive and flexible interpretations of international law.'5 
Tribunal?: Judging the 21st Century Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005 (2003) (ar- 
guing that modern military commissions should adhere to statutory court-martial pro- 
cedures). 
12 See Roth, supra note 11, at 244 (noting that the Bush administration's aggressive 
stance in the war on terrorism threatens personal liberties). 
See, e.g., Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Chal- 
lenges from the "War on Terror, " 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 56-58 (2003) (maintain- 
ing the importance of existing limits to humanitarian law and its application to the war 
on terror). But see Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, 83 FOREIGN AFF., 
Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 2, 2-3 (offering a much more nuanced account of the applicability of 
the international law of armed conflict to the war on terror). 
14 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, YEMEN: THE RULE OF LAW SIDELINED IN THE NAME OF 
SECURITY 23 (2003) ("Under existing international humanitarian law, it is not possible 
to have an international armed conflict between a state on the one hand and a non- 
state actor on the other, should the armed group not form part of the armed forces of 
a Party to the Geneva Conventions."), available at http://web.amnesty.org/ 
library/pdf/mde310062003english/$file/mde3100603.pdf; see also Michael Ratner, 
Moving Away from the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals, Executive Detentions and Torture, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2003) ("I question whether it is legal or appropriate that 
nonstate actors be tried by a military order in front of a military tribunal when it is ap- 
parent that they cannot commit violations of the laws of war, other than in a civil war 
situation."); John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 
208 (2003) (noting the argument that "the September 11 attacks were not the initia- 
tion of an armed conflict, but merely the latest eruption of a persistent social prob- 
lem," and should thus be subject to rules of criminal law, much like the war on drugs; 
or if the laws of war are to apply, then members of al Qaeda and the Taliban must be 
treated as "lawful belligerents" with the according rights and privileges). 
15 The human rights community has urged flexible interpretations of interna- 
tional law when such flexibility is necessary to address gender-based crimes, economic 
and social rights claims, children's rights, and similar issues. Human rights advocates 
have also used such arguments in, to name just a few examples, justifying the concept 
of "universal jurisdiction," lobbying for the International Criminal Court, and urging 
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In the longer run, shifting from one interpretive methodology to an- 
other based on the likely results of different methodologies is both 
unprincipled and likely to be self-defeating, as it is difficult to simulta- 
neously argue, for instance, that the law of armed conflict should be 
construed narrowly when the goal is reining in U.S. government ac- 
tions, but flexibly when the goal is holding nonstate actors account- 
able for crimes against humanity or ending impunity for gender-based 
crimes committed during armed conflicts.16 
The effort to insist on the viability of the customary distinctions 
drawn by the laws of armed conflict is also, increasingly, a rearguard 
action. The erosion of boundaries is an inescapable social fact, and 
this Article asserts that it needs to be candidly acknowledged and ad- 
dressed, rather than ignored or denied. 
To say that the erosion of traditional legal boundaries is an ines- 
capable fact is not to minimize the degree to which it is nonetheless 
genuinely cause for alarm, however; rights advocates are justifiably 
concerned about the consequences of this boundary erosion. The ex- 
istence of reasonably clear boundaries between conflict and noncon- 
flict, combatants and noncombatants, and "lawful" and "unlawful" bel- 
ligerents is what allows us to determine which legal rules apply in 
different situations, and, even more critically, allows us to identify 
people and rights meriting protection. As traditional categories lose 
their logical underpinnings, we are entering a new era: the era of War 
Everywhere." It is an era in which the legal rules that were designed 
U.S. courts to accept expansive interpretations on "the law of nations" in the context of 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. ? 
1350 (2000)). See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81 (2001) (ana- 
lyzing the history of universal jurisdiction and its current practice in the international 
community). 
16 Of course, there is another irony here as well. The Bush administration has in 
most contexts insisted that international law is not directly applicable in U.S. courts. 
See, e.g., Brief of the United States in Support of Petitioner at 24, Sosa v. Alvarez- 
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339) (arguing that sources of customary in- 
ternational law do not confer a cause of action in a U.S. court). In the context of sev- 
eral recent cases, however, the government has essentially asserted the opposite, argu- 
ing that when the government says that an armed conflict exists and designates 
someone an "enemy combatant," the international law of armed conflict immediately 
displaces constitutional law in U.S. courts. See Brief for the Petitioner at 27-28, 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027) (arguing that captured en- 
emy combatants are subject only to international "laws of war"); Brief for Respondents 
at 9-11, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (arguing that hold- 
ing enemy combatants under law of war does not violate the U.S. Constitution). 
17 The title of this Article was suggested by comments given by Mary Ellen 
O'Connell at a conference on "Globalization, Democracy, and Regulation: The Inter- 
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to protect basic rights and vulnerable groups have lost much of their 
analytical force, and thus, too often, their practical force. 
The erosion of clear boundaries in some areas of the law also 
leads to a slippery slope, allowing the disingenuous to assert that there 
is also blurriness even in areas of the law that remain both relevant 
and clear. Thus, lawyers for the Bush administration went from the 
legitimate conclusion that the Geneva Conventions cannot easily be 
applied to many modem conflicts, to the disingenuous and flawed 
conclusion that there were therefore no legal constraints at all on U.S. 
interrogation practices.18 In fact, regardless of whether or not the Ge- 
neva Conventions apply to a given conflict, and regardless of whether 
national Architecture of Law in the Twenty-First Century," held by Princeton's Law and 
Public Affairs Program on May 29, 2003. Discussing the missile attack on al Qaeda 
suspects in Yemen, O'Connell noted the danger that the "war on terror" becomes "war 
everywhere." Additionally, in a prescient book, two Chinese military officers discuss 
the social and technological changes of recent conflicts and dub the "new" warfare 
"unrestricted warfare." They warn that "this kind of war means that all means will be in 
readiness... and the battlefield will be everywhere. It means that weapons and tech- 
nology can be superimposed at will, it means that all the boundaries lying between the 
two worlds of war and non-war, of military and non-military, will be totally de- 
stroyed...." QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE 12 (1999) at 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/china/iw/unrestricted-warfare.pdf. 
18 In January 2002, White House counsel Alberto Gonzales wrote in a memo to 
President Bush that the Geneva Conventions are "obsolete" and should be declared 
inapplicable to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees held at Guantanamo. SeeJohn Barry et 
al., Special Report, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 28, 31 (quoting the Gonzales memo). 
This memo, and similar memos that followed from the DOJ's Office of the Legal 
Counsel and from the Pentagon, appear to have played a role in giving the green light 
for Pentagon approval of a range of harsh interrogation techniques, including hood- 
ing, sleep deprivation, use of dogs, sensory deprivation, nudity, and the placement of 
prisoners in painful positions for extended periods. See Hearing on Iraqi Prisoner Abuse 
Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 108th Cong. (May 11, 2004), 2004 WL 1053885 (testi- 
mony of Stephen Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence) (stating that 
the use of harsh interrogation techniques was approved at the command level in Iraq). 
When photos of egregious abuses at abu Ghraib prison in Iraq caused a worldwide 
scandal, U.S. interrogation practices came under increasing scrutiny, and many com- 
mentators (including the author) linked the abu Ghraib abuses to the Bush admini- 
stration's conviction that much international law is outmoded and irrelevant. See, e.g., 
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Opinion, A Climate that Nurtures Torture, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 
2004, at M3 ("What happened was the predictable result of the Bush administration's 
'anything goes' approach to national security."). More recent White House statements 
have backed away from the extreme positions expressed in a number of the admini- 
stration's earlier legal memos. See, e.g., Lieutenant General Anthony Jones, Special De- 
fense Department Briefing on Results of Investigation of Military Intelligence Activities 
at Abu Ghraib Prison Facility (Aug. 25, 2004) (transcript available at 
http://defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040825-1224.html) (stating that the doc- 
trine and policies of the military are consistent with the Geneva Conventions and that 
this has been reinforced in recent memos). 
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or not a particular detainee is entitled to the protections of the Ge- 
neva Conventions, international law and U.S. treaty commitments 
prohibit the use of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or de- 
grading treatment of detainees-and there can be little doubt that 
many of the interrogation practices authorized by the Pentagon con- 
stitute torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.19 In prac- 
tice, then, the breakdown of clear boundaries in some areas of the law 
also dangerously undermines the efficacy of other legal rules.20 
19 See supra note 10 (discussing international legal standards governing humane 
treatment of detainees). Many of the Pentagon's approved interrogation techniques 
also run afoul of accepted American legal standards. In a letter to Senator Patrick 
Leahy, dated June 25, 2003, Defense Department General Counsel William Haynes 
acknowledged that the Convention Against Torture not only requires the United States 
not to engage in torture, but also requires the United States to "prevent other acts of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to tor- 
ture." Letter from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of De- 
fense, to Senator Patrick J. Leahy (June 25, 2003) (quoting Convention Against Tor- 
ture, supra note 10, art. 16, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 at 23, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 116), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-leahy.pdf. Haynes noted that 
a U.S. reservation to the Convention Against Torture states that the United States un- 
derstands "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" to mean those acts 
that are "prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Con- 
stitution of the United States." Id. (quoting S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 at 15-16). 
Haynes confirmed that "United States policy is to treat all detainees and conduct all 
interrogations, wherever they may occur, in a manner consistent with this commitment." 
Id. (emphasis added). There is a large body of U.S. case law interpreting the due pro- 
cess and cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and it is quite clear that numerous interrogation techniques currently 
approved by the Department of Defense would violate those constitutional prohibi- 
tions if used against U.S. suspects or prisoners. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 
741 (2002) (holding that the plaintiffs allegations of being handcuffed to a hitching 
post, if true, established an Eighth Amendment violation); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 
707, 707 (1967) (finding a Fourteenth Amendment violation in the taking of an invol- 
untary confession; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945) (noting that the in- 
troduction of an involuntary confession as evidence can violate Fourteenth Amend- 
ment due process). 
20 It is important to distinguish between plausible readings of the Geneva Conven- 
tions and implausible readings. Throughout this Article, I argue that various U.S. gov- 
ernment assertions-such as those relating to the government's ability to designate 
U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants," those relating to the distinction between lawful 
and unlawful combatants, etc.-are legally plausible, although they are troubling from 
a policy perspective and from the viewpoint of ensuring government accountability 
and protecting fundamental rights. That is, the changed nature of modern security 
threats genuinely erodes the traditional distinctions between war and peace, combat- 
ants and noncombatants, etc., and creates real ambiguity about the most appropriate 
legal paradigm to apply in various current situtations. 
Bush administration efforts to justify interrogation techniques such as hooding, 
sleep deprivation, use of dogs, sensory deprivation, nudity, and the placement of pris- 
oners in painful positions for extended periods present a different issue altogether. 
Regardless of the applicable legal framework, the international legal standards govern- 
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In the long run, the old categories and rules need to be replaced 
by a radically different system that better reflects the changed nature 
of twenty-first century conflict and threat. What such a radically dif- 
ferent system would look like is difficult to say, and the world commu- 
nity is unlikely to develop a consensus around such a new system any- 
time soon. This Article suggests, nonetheless, that international 
human rights law provides some benchmarks for evaluating U.S. gov- 
ernment actions in the war on terror, and ultimately for developing a 
new analytical framework that can successfully balance the need to re- 
spond to new kinds of security threats with the equally important need 
to preserve and protect basic human rights. 
Unlike domestic U.S. law and the law of armed conflict, interna- 
tional human rights law applies to all people at all times, regardless of 
citizenship, location, or status.21 Although human rights law permits 
limited derogation in times of emergency, it also outlines core rights 
that cannot be eliminated regardless of the nature of the threat or the 
existence or nonexistence of an armed conflict.22 Applying the stan- 
ing minimally humane treatment of detainees clearly prohibit most of the practices 
authorized by the Pentagon, as do U.S. constitutional norms and U.S. understandings 
of our legal obligations under the Torture Convention. See supra notes 10, 18-19. 
Thus, although at first blush it might seem that the erosion of traditional legal 
boundaries creates an environment in which harsh interrogation techniques could be 
viewed as legitimate, this is not the case. A general U.S. government feeling that the 
Geneva Conventions are ill-suited to modern conflicts almost certainly contributed to 
an overall atmosphere in which even legal rules that remain clear and relevant were 
seen as somehow "optional," but this view rests on a forced and disingenuous reading 
of both international and U.S. law. 
My concern in this Article is to discuss those aspects of the law of armed conflict 
that have become genuinely ambiguous in light of changed external circumstances. 
Since the prohibitions on torture and cruel or inhumane treatment remain quite un- 
ambiguous, despite some Bush administration assertions to the contrary, this Article 
will not devote significant time to discussing the debate about interrogation practices. 
See, e.g., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), INTERNATIONAL HUMANI- 
TARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
1 (2003) ("Human rights are inherent entitlements which belong to every person as a 
consequence of being human."), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57JR8L/$FILE/IHLand_IHRL.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2004); see also Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law and the War on Ter- 
rorism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 58, 65 (2002) ("Some rights are not subject to 
derogation even in times of public emergency."). 
12 See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 
(July 8) (noting that "the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Politi- 
cal Rights does not cease in times of war"); see also The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 181, 
193 (1814) (noting that "rights of humanity" pertain in time of war); Jordan J. Paust, 
Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 503, 505 (2003) ("Under international law, human rights standards that are 
both treaty-based and part of customary international law [are] applicable in times of 
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dards of international human rights law in both domestic and interna- 
tional contexts would not solve all the problems created by the in- 
creasing irrelevance of other legal frameworks, but it would provide at 
least a basic floor, a minimum set of standards by which international 
and domestic governmental actions could be evaluated. U.S. courts 
are free to make use of applicable international human rights law, 
though they rarely do so; this Article urges U.S. courts to make greater 
recourse to international human rights law in evaluating legal chal- 
lenges to post-September 11 government action. International hu- 
man rights law and norms can also be used as a political benchmark 
for evaluating uses of force by the U.S. in the international context. 
Human rights norms also can, and should, be the starting point for 
developing a new legal framework in which to view state responses to 
new and emerging security threats. 
A great deal has already been written about ambiguities and gaps 
in the law of armed conflict,23 about how the law of armed conflict 
should (or should not) be applied to the events of September 11 and 
to terrorism in general,24 and about the threats to human rights and 
both peace and war ... ."). 
2See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitar- 
ian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 202 
(1998) (attributing gaps and ambiguities in the law of armed conflict to "the haphaz- 
ard evolution of international criminal law" and lack of governmental desire to close 
gaps); see also W. Michael Reisman & James Silk, Which Law Applies to the Afghan Con- 
flict?, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 466 (1988) (noting the ambiguous legal situation of con- 
flicts between opposition forces and a state intervening on behalf of the established 
government); James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in Interna- 
tional Humanitarian Law: A Critique ofInternationalized Armed Conflict, 85 INT'L REV. RED 
CROSS 313, 314 (2003) (calling for a single law of armed conflict to remedy current 
failures in the law when conflicts contain both international and noninternational 
elements). 
24 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of 
War, 28 YALEJ. INT'L L. 325, 326 (2003) (asserting that the United States cannot be at 
war with al Qaeda because of international law's definition of war as involving a nation- 
state, belligerent, or insurgent group and defining an insurgent group as having "the 
semblance of a government, an organized military force, control of significant portions 
of territory as its own, and its own relatively stable population or base of support within 
a broader population"); William H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some 
Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 320 (2003) ("The law of armed conflict pro- 
vides the most appropriate legal framework for regulating the use of force in the war 
on terrorism."); Amanda Schaffer, Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: 
An In-Depth Analysis of the Government's Right to Classify United States Citizens Suspected of 
Terrorism as Enemy Combatants and Try Those Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1465, 1466 (2003) (determining that the United States should try 
terrorists by military trials rather than in civilian court). 
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civil liberties posed by the "war on terror."25 But as in the parable of 
the three blind men and the elephant,26 each commentator focuses on 
only one or two pieces of the picture, and the larger reality goes un- 
appreciated. This Article seeks to focus on that larger reality (the for- 
est, rather than the trees, to shift metaphors), suggesting we entirely 
lack an adequate domestic or international legal paradigm for think- 
ing about the changes brought about by the rise of global terrorism. 
This is hard for many to accept, since it implies that at the mo- 
ment there are few domestic or international legal constraints on the 
war on terror." Nonetheless, this Article asserts that acknowledging 
this is better, in the long run, than denying it. Rather than insisting 
on the continued validity of obsolete legal paradigms, we should take 
25 See Taft, supra note 24, at 321 (claiming that even if terrorists are denied POW 
status, they still have a right to humane treatment); see also Rudolf Dolzer, Clouds on the 
Horizon of Humanitarian Law?, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 337, 338 (2003) ("In the absence of 
an expectation of reciprocity during armed conflict.., public support for a graceful 
conduct of warfare may vanish quickly."); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 11, at 1260 (de- 
claring the President's Order establishing military tribunals for the trial of terrorists 
unconstitutional); Ratner, supra note 14, at 1516 (examining whether military tribu- 
nals are outlawed by the Geneva Conventions); Roth, supra note 11, at 237 (arguing 
that the actions of the United States in the fight against terrorism are "putting at risk 
the human rights ideal"). 
26 For one variant of this famous story, see JAMES BALDWIN, The Blind Men and the 
Elephant, in FIFTY FAMOUS STORIES RETOLD 130-31 (New York, Am. Book Co. 1896), 
available at http://www.mainlesson.com/display.php?author=baldwin&book=fifty& 
story=blind. 
There were once six blind men who stood by the road-side every day .... 
It so happened one morning that an el-e-phant was driven down the road 
where they stood.... 
Of course they could not see him with their eyes; but they thought that by 
touching him they could learn just what kind of animal he was. 
The first one happened to put his hand on the elephant's side. "Well, well!" 
he said, "now I know all about this beast. He is ex-act-ly like a wall." 
The second felt only of the elephant's tusk. "My brother," he said, "you are 
mistaken. He is not at all like a wall. He is round and smooth and sharp. He 
is more like a spear than anything else." 
The third happened to take hold of the elephant's trunk. "Both of you are 
wrong," he said. "Anybody who knows anything can see that this elephant is 
like a snake." 
Then the elephant moved on, and the six blind men sat by the roadside all 
day, and quar-reled about him. Each believed that he knew just how the ani- 
mal looked; and each called the others hard names because they did not 
agree with him. People who have eyes sometimes act as foolishly. 
Id. 
27 To say that there are few legal constraints does not mean that there are no con- 
straints at all, of course. Despite its superpower status, the U.S. government faces po- 
litical, financial, and diplomatic constraints in the war on terror. 
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stock of the tools international human rights law offers for evaluating 
and critiquing the war on terror. At the same time, we need to begin 
to imagine the basic contours of a new domestic and international le- 
gal paradigm, one that balances the need to respond to new security 
threats with the need to protect core rights. This Article seeks to be- 
gin that process. 
Part I of this Article is devoted to background, briefly describing, 
first, the evolution and content of the law of armed conflict and the 
international system it presupposes. Second, it explores the parallel 
domestic legal assumptions embodied in what we can loosely refer to 
as national security law. Part II chronicles some of the recent changes 
that are rendering these background assumptions and categories in- 
creasingly less coherent and relevant. 
Part III examines the concrete ways in which the boundaries be- 
tween traditional categories have eroded, looking at various defini- 
tional boundaries (such as those between "international" and "inter- 
nal" armed conflict, and between "armed conflict" and "crime"), 
spatial/geographical boundaries, temporal boundaries, boundaries 
between categories of persons, and the boundaries between "national 
security" matters and "purely domestic" matters as understood by U.S. 
courts.28 
Part IV discusses the implications of the erosion of these bounda- 
ries, and concludes that rights advocates are correct to suspect that 
there is much to fear. Part V suggests that international human rights 
law may offer a partial and interim solution to the problem. Part VI 
acknowledges that a more thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the 
law of armed conflict is necessary in the longer run, and offers some 
preliminary suggestions for how such a reconceptualization might 
proceed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Law of Armed Conflict 
In peace, there's nothing so becomes a man, 
As modest stillness, and humility: 
But when the blast of war blows in our ears, 
Then imitate the action of the tiger: 
28 As mentioned in note 20, supra, I will not spend much time discussing the de- 
bate about permissible and impermissible interrogation techniques, because I consider 
that a fundamentally different issue. 
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Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood, 
Disguise fair nature with hard-favored rage; 
Then lend the eye a terrible aspect.29 
Efforts to control and limit warfare are almost as old as warfare it- 
self,30 but the modern law of armed conflict has its roots in the nine- 
teenth century, when efforts to formally codify the rules of war began 
in the West." In 1856, the Conference of Paris sought to come up 
with rules governing naval warfare.32 In 1863, during the American 
Civil War, the United States Army issued General Order No. 100, In- 
structions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field." Based on the recommendations of Columbia University pro- 
fessor Francis Lieber, and better known as the Lieber Code, General 
Order No. 100 laid out basic rules concerning permissible and im- 
permissible methods of warfare, including rules relating to the treat- 
ment of civilians.3 Also in 1863, Swiss citizen Henry Dunant founded 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) "for the pur- 
29 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V, act 3, sc. 1. 
3O Consider biblical injunctions to show mercy to captives or Athenian codes of 
military conduct. See, e.g., 2 Kings 6:21-22 ("Set food and water before them so they 
may eat and drink."); THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR 193 (Robert B. Strassler ed., 1996). See generally MICHAEL 
HOWARD, WAR IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 6-7 (1976) ("By the fourteenth century the laws 
and limitations on the conduct of war were elaborate, much written about, and fairly 
uniform throughout western Christendom.... [T]hey were seen less as a system of 
positive law or as restraints consciously dictated by humanitarianism than as a code of 
social behaviour."). 
31 See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (2d ed. 
1994) (examining the legality of war); THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE 
IN THE WESTERN WORLD (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994) (examining the traditions 
of both formal constraints on warfare and unwritten conventions as to proper military 
practice). 
3Z See Michael Howard, Constraints on Warfare, in THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 31, 
at 6-7 (discussing attempts to constrain warfare during the nineteenth and early twen- 
tieth centuries). 
33 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
THE FIELD (LIEBER INSTRUCTIONS), Gen. Order No. 100 (Dep't of War Apr. 24, 1863), 
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lieber.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 
2004). 
34 See id. art. 19 ("Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their 
intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the women 
and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences."); id. art. 22 
("The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to 
be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will ad- 
mit."); id. art. 25 ("[P]rotection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the 
rule 
...."). 
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pose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, de- 
voted and thoroughly qualified volunteers.""35 Dunant also urged the 
leaders of European states to develop "some international principle, 
sanctioned by a convention and inviolate in character, which, once 
agreed upon and ratified, might constitute the basis for societies for 
the relief of the wounded in the different European countries."36 In 
1864, Dunant's efforts were rewarded; ten European states ratified the 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field (First Geneva Convention). 
Efforts to constrain armed conflict continued; in 1899 and 1907, 
international peace conferences at The Hague led to the drafting and 
later entry into force of the various Hague Conventions on the laws 
and customs of war," and in the interwar period, the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact between the United States and fourteen other nations made it il- 
legal to have "recourse to war for the solution of international contro- 
versies."39 In the wake of World War II, the 1945 U.N. Charter ce- 
mented the prohibition on waging aggressive war. The Charter laid 
out the basic conditions in which states may resort to the use of force, 
declaring that "[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes 
by peaceful means .... [and] refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or po- 
litical independence of any state."40 The four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 further rationalized and codified customary and treaty-based 
norms relating to armed conflict, outlining the rules applicable to ci- 
vilians, prisoners of war, and wounded and sick members of armed 
forces.41 
F5 From the Battle of Sol Ferino to the First Geneva Convention and Beyond: Founding and 
Early Years of the ICRC (1863-1914), ICRC (June 4, 1998), available at http:// 
www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57JNVP (last visited Sept. 16, 2004). 
36 Id. 
37 Id.; see also THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 31, at 6 (discussing the signing of the 
First Geneva Convention and the events leading up to it). 
Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Conven- 
tion]; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2295 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
39 Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renun- 
ciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact), Aug. 27, 
1928, art. I, 46 Stat. 2343, 2345. 
40 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, paras. 3-4. 
41 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, 6 U.S.T. at 3114, 3217, 3316, 3517, 75 
U.N.T.S. at 31, 85, 135, 287. The full texts of the four Geneva Conventions are avail- 
able online at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwplist1l33/578438309B69 
EB59C1256EA90026A03C. 
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This process of seeking to constrain armed conflict has continued 
into the present time. In 1974, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a 
definition of state "aggression" for the first time.42 In 1977, an inter- 
national conference led to two Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions, both of which have been widely ratified.4 More re- 
cently, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal tribu- 
nals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda have breathed new life into our un- 
derstanding of war crimes and crimes against humanity,44 as has the 
process of negotiating the statute governing the new International 
Criminal Court.45 As recently as 2002, a new Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child entered into force, enhancing 
international legal mechanisms designed to protect children during 
armed conflicts. 
42 G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 
(1974) ("Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, terri- 
torial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner in- 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations ... ."). 
43 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re- 
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter Protocol I] (setting forth protocols for the treatment of civil- 
ians and combatants in situations of armed conflict); Protocol Additional to the Ge- 
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- 
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol 
II] (extending the human rights guarantees of Protocol I to noninternational armed 
conflicts). More than three-fourths of all nation-states have ratified these Additional 
Protocols. The United States is one of the few western nations that has not ratified 
them, but the United States accepts most provisions of the Additional Protocols as 
binding norms of customary international law, and/or consistent with U.S. practice. 
See INT'L & OPERATIONAL AW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCH., OP- 
ERATIONAL AW HANDBOOK 7-13 (Jeanne M. Meyer & Brian J. Bill eds., 2002), available 
at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMOPublic. 
nsf/0/ 1 af4860452f962c085256a490049856f/$FILE/Master%20Document.pdf, for 
a brief description of those aspects of the Additional Protocols considered binding by 
the United States. 
44For a general overview of tribunal case law, see HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: 
TOPICAL DIGESTS OF THE CASE LAW OF TIlE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
(2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/ij. 
45 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (establishing an International Criminal Court 
having jurisdiction over genocide and other crimes against humanity), available at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm. 
46 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the In- 
volvement of Children in Armed Conflict, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 106-37 (2000), 39 
I.L.M. 1285 (entered intro force Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/opac.htm. The United States has signed and ratified this 
agreement. 
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These various treaties have been widely ratified,47 and to a signifi- 
cant extent, core provisions of these treaties have been accepted as 
customary international law4 that binds even those states that are not 
parties to the treaties, and that also binds nonstate actors (such as in- 
surgent groups), which lack the legal capacity to ratify treaties.49 Thus, 
for example, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which 
outlines the minimum protections that must be afforded to noncom- 
batants, is now generally accepted as universally binding on all parties 
to all armed conflicts. 
The law of armed conflict governs many different aspects of 
armed conflicts, but it mainly consists of those rules traditionally re- 
ferred to as jus in bello, "law in war," which relate to the manner in 
which armed conflict may proceed. Jus in bello consists of rules relat- 
ing to proper and improper kinds of weapons and military tactics, 
rules relating to the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians, and so 
on." (Jus in bello is contrasted with jus ad bellum, the laws relating to 
47 Of the 191 member states of the United Nations, all 191 are party to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, 162 are party to Additional Protocol I, and 157 are party to Addi- 
tional Protocol II. States Party to the Geneva Conventions and Their Additional Protocols, 
ICRC (Jan. 6, 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/party_gc. 
48 For a general discussion of customary international law, see Statute of the In- 
ternational Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, 1060 (defining what 
international law should be applied by the International Court of Justice); RE- 
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) 
[hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW] (covering international law as it relates to the 
United States, which stems largely from customary international law); MARK E. 
VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL AW AND TREATIES (1985) (providing general 
discussion of customary international law). 
See FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 48, at 16-21 (explaining that parties 
may be bound by a rule of customary law that they did not participate in making). 
See FRANCOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 109 (Laura Brau trans. & ed., 2002) ("[T]he Conventions clearly establish that 
these are minimum norms to be respected in all situations of conflict."); see also Mili- 
tary and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (judging the 
United States according to the general principles of international law, and binding it 
to refrain from encouraging groups engaged in conflicts involving violations of Com- 
mon Article 3); Prosecutor v. Tadic, 105 I.L.R. 419 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia 1995) (finding jurisdiction to try a Serbian soldier for crimes against hu- 
manity in violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions); INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 692-93, 695 (JordanJ. Paust et al. eds, 2d ed. 2000) (discussing the legal 
precedent that makes Common Article 3 a definitive part of customary international 
law). 
51 Good general books on the law of armed conflict include BOUCHET-SAULNIER, 
supra note 50 (explaining the rights, definitions, and relevant legal instruments that 
constitute humanitarian law); INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR (2d ed. 2000) (explor- 
ing the legal context of modemrn warfare, including the roles of transnational organiza- 
tions); DINSTEIN, supra note 31 (analyzing the concepts of war, aggression, and self- 
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when it is proper to resort to armed conflict, a question now governed 
mainly by the U.N. Charter. Some commentators consider applicable 
U.N. Charter provisions part of the law of armed conflict, broadly 
conceived, while others regard this as outside of the laws of armed 
conflict.)52 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to summarize the law of 
armed conflict, but it is important to note a few key principles and dis- 
tinctions, some of which are probably familiar even to laypersons, oth- 
ers of which are likely unfamiliar to nonspecialists. To begin with, the 
law of armed conflict accepts that certain behaviors that are illegal 
and abhorrent in time of peace are both permissible and desirable in 
time of war.53 Most obviously, the purposeful killing of other humans 
is considered morally abhorrent in peacetime, but in time of war sol- 
diers are not only permitted, but required, to try to incapacitate 
members of enemy forces, if necessary by killing them. 
The principle of "combatant immunity" flows from the disconnect 
between appropriate peacetime behavior and appropriate wartime 
behavior. In peacetime, the willful killing of another human would 
normally lead to prosecution, trial, and possibly conviction for the 
crime of murder. During and after wars, however, soldiers cannot be 
prosecuted for killing enemy combatants; their deadly violence is le- 
gally immunized." The same goes for numerous other forms of vio- 
lence: the deliberate destruction or appropriation of public or private 
property is normally punishable in time of peace, but generally per- 
missible in time of war." As a result, the law of armed conflict pro- 
vides that combatants taken prisoner by opposing forces may be de- 
tained until the cessation of hostilities, but they may not be subject to 
punishment by opposing forces for their legitimate wartime acts, and 
they must be released and repatriated when hostilities end.: 
defense in light of the transnational political changes that have occurred since the end 
of the Cold War). 
52 See DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 71 (explaining the position of Pompe, Anzilotti, 
and other exponents of the extralegality of war, who believe that "law cannot say when, 
but only how, war is to be waged"). 
53 See BOUCHET-SAULNIER, supra note 50, at 50 ("As long as [combatants'] use of 
force is in conformity with the provisions of the laws of war, they may not be subject to 
criminal pursuit."). 54 Id.; see also INT'L &8 OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, supra note 43, at 12 (defining the 
conduct of hostilities during wartime). 
5 INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, supra note 43, at 16-17 (authorizing the "de- 
struction, capture or neutralization" of property "if it offers a definite military advan- 
tage"). 
SSee Translation of the Draft of an International Declaration Concerning the 
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Of course, violence in wartime is only immunized to the extent 
that it is otherwise in accordance with the law of armed conflict. The 
law of armed conflict only offers benefits to those who play by the 
rules. Thus, the laws of armed conflict distinguish between violence 
that is justified by military necessity and militarily unjustifiable vio- 
lence, and also between violence that is directed properly against en- 
emy combatants and violence that is improperly directed against "pro- 
tected persons," a category that includes both civilians and enemy 
combatants who are wounded, sick, or who have been taken pris- 
57 
oner. 
To put this in the terms used by the law of armed conflict, military 
violence must seek to avoid "unnecessary" suffering, and violence 
must be in accordance with the principles of proportionality and dis- 
crimination," or else it is not immunized. The principle of propor- 
tionality requires that "[1]oss of life and damage to property incidental 
to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage expected to be gained"; the principle of discrimi- 
nation requires that military violence must "distinguish between com- 
batants and noncombatants; military objectives and protected peo- 
ple/protected places."59 
Military actions not in accordance with these basic principles lack 
immunity, and military officials who order or carry out acts of exces- 
sive and unnecessary violence or attacks on protected persons and 
Laws and Customs of War adopted by the Conference of Brussels, 27th August, 1874, 
art. 9 (citing the four conditions armed forces must meet in order for their members 
to be treated as a combatants: (1) "[t]hat they have at their head a person responsible 
for his subordinates"; (2) "[t]hat they wear some fixed distinctive badge recognizable 
at a distance"; (3) "[t]hat they carry arms openly"; and (4) "[t]hat in their operations 
they conform to the laws and customs of war."), reprinted in A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE 
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES CONCERNING 
THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR 274 (1909); see also United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 
2d 541, 557 & n.34 (E.D. Va. 2002) (noting that these criteria were "established under 
customary international law" and "were first codified in large part in the Brussels Dec- 
laration of 1874"). 
57 See, e.g., INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, supra note 43, at 12 ("Among others, 
non-combatants include civilians, medical personnel, chaplains, and those out of com- 
bat-including prisoners of war and the wounded and sick."). See generally Goldman & 
Tittemore, supra note 7, at 2-5 (tracing the historical and legal distinctions between 
privileged and unprivileged combatant status in customary and conventional interna- 
tional law). 
58 Sometimes the principle of discrimination is also called the principle of distinc- 
tion. See INT'L & OPERATIONAL AW DEP'T, supra note 43, at 10 ("[The principle of 
distinction] requires that combatants be distinguished from non-combatants, and that 
military objectives be distinguished from property or protected places."). 
59 Id. at 31. 
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places may be subject to later prosecutions for war crimes.60 Combat- 
ants whose conduct violates these basic principles or otherwise fails to 
comply with the law of armed conflict may be tried and punished dur- 
ing or after the armed conflict if they are captured by opposing forces; 
they can be dubbed "unlawful combatants" by opposing forces, and 
are not entitled to the protections and immunities given to "prisoners 
of war," who are "lawful combatants."61 
The United States is a party to nearly all of the treaties that to- 
gether constitute the international law of armed conflict,62 and for the 
most part the international law of armed conflict is reflected in U.S. 
60 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines war crimes as: 
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any 
of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provi- 
sions of the relevant Geneva Convention [or] (b) Other serious violations of 
the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the es- 
tablished framework of international law, namely, any of the following 
acts: .... Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack 
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian ob- 
jects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment 
which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated; [or a] ttacking or bombarding, by whatever 
means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and 
which are not military objectives. 
Rome Statute, supra note 45, art. 8. 
61 For example: 
As early as July 2002, the federal district court judge in [the case of John 
Walker Lindh] had ruled that Lindh, a U.S. citizen who had taken up arms 
with the Taliban, could not invoke the protections of the Geneva Conventions 
by arguing that he was a lawful combatant-a soldier-fighting a war on the 
side of the Taliban. 
Wilson, supra note 6, at 5. Goldman & Tittemore state: 
An 
"unprivileged" or "unlawful" combatant refers to a person who does not 
have the combatant's privilege, but nevertheless directly or actively partici- 
pates in hostilities. Such unlawful combatants would include civilians, certain 
civilians accompanying the armed forces, as well as noncombatants members 
of the armed forces, who, in violation of their protected status, actively engage 
in hostilities. These persons temporarily forfeit their immunity from direct 
individualized attack during such time as they assume the role of a combatant. 
Unlike privileged combatants, unlawful combatants upon capture can be tried 
and punished under municipal law for their unprivileged belligerency, even if 
their hostile acts complied with the laws of war. 
Goldman & Tittemore, supra note 7, at 4. 
62 The main exceptions are Additional Protocols I and II, but the United States 
has formally acknowledged core provisions of these as binding upon it as a matter of 
customary international law. See INT'L & OPERATIONAL AW DEP'T, supra note 43, at 11 
(delineating the articles of the Protocols that the United States finds either legally 
binding as customary international law or acceptable practice though not legally bind- 
ing). 
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military regulations, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and other 
federal statutes." To the extent that a state of armed conflict exists, 
both U.S. military courts and U.S. civilian courts will apply the inter- 
national law of armed conflict insofar as it is reflected in U.S. law, and 
at times U.S. courts will also turn directly to the international law of 
armed conflict for the purpose of gap-filling or construing otherwise 
ambiguous aspects of U.S. law that derive from the law of armed con- 
flict.64 
B. National Security Law 
Just as the international law of armed conflict permits certain ac- 
tivities in time of war that would be unlawful in time of peace, U.S. 
domestic law recognizes that national security imperatives may render 
permissible some otherwise impermissible government acts.65 To a 
63 See, e.g., id. at 28-29 (setting forth the jurisdictions for various violations of the 
law of armed conflict); see also The War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. ? 2441 (2000) 
(giving U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over war crimes cases involving a U.S. national, 
military or nonmilitary, as either accused or victim). 
64 See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942) ("From the very beginning of its 
history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war ... "); see also Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004) (looking to various international treaties to 
support the proposition that "[i]t is a clearly established principle of the law of war 
that detention may last no longer than active hostilities"); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. 763 (1950) (applying international law to conclude that federal courts cannot ex- 
ercise jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by nonresident aliens being held 
overseas by the U.S. military); cf A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 
2003 WIS. L. REV. 309, 363 ("In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the 
once relatively obscure Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Quirin has become critical 
to legal and constitutional debates about civil liberties' import during times of interna- 
tional terror."). 
65 See, e.g., Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (declaring a state of armed 
conflict and authorizing special military tribunals to try aliens suspected of involve- 
ment in terrorist activities); see also Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2647 ("[T]he law of war and 
the realities of combat may render such detentions [of enemy combatants] both neces- 
sary and appropriate, and our due process analysis need not blink at those realities."). 
Nonetheless, the Hamdi Court found the specific practice of holding U.S. citizens in- 
definitely to be unacceptable, although the Court was divided about the degree of due 
process required in such situations; cf Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 714 (2d Cir. 
2003) ("The Constitution envisions grave national emergencies and contemplates sig- 
nificant domestic abridgements of individual liberties during such times."), rev'd and 
remanded by 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). The Supreme Court reversed in Padilla on techni- 
cal grounds, again leaving unanswered questions about the degree of due process 
owed to U.S. citizens detained on U.S. soil. See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144, 165-66 (1963) (holding it unconstitutional to denude an American citizen of 
her citizenship for leaving the United States to avoid military service during a time of 
war). 
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significant extent this is reflected in various federal statutes that have 
historically permitted the executive branch certain extraordinary 
powers in times of national security emergencies and war.66 The most 
recent example of such legislation is the USA PATRIOT Act, passed by 
Congress in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.67 
The PATRIOT Act is typical of emergency legislation; it has a sunset 
provision, under which many of its terms expire in 2005, but in the 
meantime it grants vastly expanded investigatory and surveillance 
powers to the federal government.68 
66 See, e.g., National Emergencies Act (NEA) ? 201, 50 U.S.C. ? 1621 (2000)) 
(authorizing the President to declare national emergencies); International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. ?? 1701-1706 (2000)) (granting the President authority to deal 
with unusual or extraordinary threats); see also HAROLD RELYEA, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES, at v (Special Comm. on Nat'l Emergencies 
& Delegated Emergency Powers, Working Paper No. 36-612, 1974) (studying the use of 
emergency powers from the time of the Constitutional Convention through the 
1870s). See generally Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Al- 
ways Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003) (exploring the tendency during times 
of national crisis for democratic nations to race to the bottom in the protection of civil 
liberties). 
67 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49 & 50 
U.S.C.). 
68 Id. The USA PATRIOT Act creates a broadly defined new federal crime of ter- 
rorism; expands the ability of the CIA and FBI to initiate "roving" wiretaps; allows ex- 
panded intelligence and law enforcement access to personal information of individuals 
(including medical, school, and financial records); expands search and seizure rules; 
and so on. Some, but not all, of the Act's provisions will expire on December 31, 2005 
if not extended by Congress. For an analysis of the legality of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
see Steven W. Becker, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall. .. ": Assessing the Aftermath of September 
11th, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 563 (2003), who states: 
The happenings of September 11th simply provided law-enforcement and in- 
telligence interests with the golden opportunity to (1) enact proposals that 
previously had been rejected or were found to be unconstitutional and (2) en- 
large their own powers while concomitantly eroding the civil liberties of law- 
abiding American citizens. Contrary to popular perception, the USA PA- 
TRIOT Act is not directed exclusively at suspected foreign terrorists. 
Id. at 592-93 (footnote omitted); see also Tracey Topper Gonzalez, Individual Rights Ver- 
sus Collective Security: Assessing the Constitutionality of the USA PATRIOT Act, U. MIAMI 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV., Fall 2003, at 75, 103-12 (describing surveillance methods that 
are being used more by the government since the Act's removal of procedural hur- 
dles); David Hardin, Note, The Fuss over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of the 
USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to EISA Under the IFourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 291, 294 (2003) ("[T]he technical modification to [the 1978 Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act by the USA PATRIOT Act] fails to provide an appropriate balance 
between the government's interest in national security and an individual's Fourth 
Amendment rights."); Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic or Unconstitutional?: The Mandatory 
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It is in the courts, however, that the distinction between "national 
security" matters and purely domestic matters has been most often 
elaborated, with courts fairly consistently affording greater deference 
to government decisions and findings when it comes to national secu- 
rity than when it comes to domestic affairs."6 The modern doctrine of 
judicial deference in national security matters is usually traced back to 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright, the 1936 case in which the Supreme 
Court famously upheld an arms embargo created by presidential ex- 
ecutive order. In Curtiss-Wright, the Court stated that even though 
"the challenged delegation [of congressional power to the President], 
if it were confined to internal affairs, would be invalid," it may "never- 
theless be sustained on the ground that its exclusive aim is to afford a 
remedy for a hurtful condition within foreign territory."70 Following 
Curtiss-Wright, the Court has generally continued to insist that 
"[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security 
are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention."71 In practice, this 
has often meant that courts have been less willing to protect individ- 
ual rights from government interference when the stated reason for 
government interference is connected to national security.72 
Courts have used a wide range of mechanisms that have had the 
effect of judicial acquiescence in otherwise problematic or impermis- 
sible government actions when these actions are taken in the name of 
Detention of Aliens Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1421 (2003) (ar- 
guing that the Act's "provisions for certification and mandatory detention contravene 
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law"). 
69 See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 74 (1973) (stating that the Freedom of In- 
formation Act exempts matters "specifically required by Executive Order to be kept 
secret"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) ("[The executive should be] indulge [d] the widest latitude of interpre- 
tation to sustain his exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, 
at least when turned against the outside world for the security of our society. But, 
when it is turned inward... [he] should have no such indulgence."); Chi. & S. Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (asserting that executive 
decisions about foreign policy are decisions that "belong in the domain of political 
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (stating that the President needs to be given "a 
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction" when mainly interna- 
tional affairs are at issue). See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 5 (detailing historical 
instances of governmental infringement on civil liberties and commenting that it is 
during periods of declared war that the government has the greatest power to so act). 
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315. 
71 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981). 
72 But cf Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579 (holding that the President's order to seize 
most of the nation's steel plants was unconstitutional despite the potential national 
emergency that might result from work stoppage in the industry). 
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national security. At times, courts have decided cases on the merits 
but have also given great deference to executive judgments about na- 
tional security imperatives.7" At other times, courts have applied vari- 
ous balancing tests, but have tended to conclude that national security 
considerations outweigh individual rights.74 At still other times, courts 
have found means of avoiding decisions on the merits by employing 
the "political question" doctrine or related doctrines of justiciability, 
standing, jurisdiction, and ripeness to allow government actions to 
stand.75 
U.S. history is replete with examples of restrictions on individual 
liberties that have been upheld in the context of national security im- 
peratives but that would likely not have been permitted absent such 
justifications.76 During World War I, for instance, the 1917 Espionage 
Act and the 1918 Sedition Act placed severe limitations on First 
73 See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645 (asserting that the "widest latitude of inter- 
pretation" is needed to sustain the President's function to command instruments of 
national force); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (justifying an 
exclusion order targeting persons of Japanese ancestry, based on the threat to national 
security). For a comparison of Korematsu to current events, see Liam Braber, Com- 
ment, Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of Race and National Security, 47 
VILL. L. REV. 451 (2002). 
74 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24 (finding that the segregation and detention of 
Japanese Americans on the West Coast during World War II was justified by military 
and security concerns at the time). 
75 See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd and remanded 
by 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) ("[W]hether a state of armed conflict exists against an enemy 
to which the laws of war apply is a political question for the President, not the 
courts."); see also Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2715 ("We confront two questions: First, did Pa- 
dilla properly file his habeas petition in the Southern District of New York; and second, 
did the President possess authority to detain Padilla militarily. We answer the thresh- 
old question in the negative and thus do not reach the second question presented."); 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) ("Certainly it is not the function of 
the Judiciary to entertain private litigation-even by a citizen-which challenges the 
legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our 
armed forces abroad or to any particular region."); Norman Dorsen, Civil Liberties, Na- 
tional Security and Human Rights Treaties: A Snapshot in Context, 3 U.C. DAVISJ. INT'L L. 
& POL'Y 143, 146-47 (1997) (discussing different principal decisional techniques used 
by the Supreme Court to restrict civil liberties). But see Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 
(2004) (declaring that U.S. courts have jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay detainees). 
See REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 224 (noting that judicial decisions that are 
made after hostilities have ceased are more likely to favor civil liberties than if made 
while hostilities are ongoing); Dorsen, supra note 75, at 143 (noting that national secu- 
rity has usually been a "graveyard[] for civil liberties"); Lewis, supra note 11, at 260 
(commenting on the erosion of civil liberties post-September 11); Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Note, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 154 (2004) (describing the 
authority to incarcerate or otherwise restrain individuals without a pre-existing statu- 
tory basis). 
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Amendment rights and were used to prosecute more than 2000 peo- 
ple; for the most part, U.S. courts upheld the provisions of these acts 
in the name of national security.77 In 1940, the Alien Registration Act 
was passed, with similar limitations on free expression, and was simi- 
larly upheld by the courts on national security grounds.78 The courts 
also upheld other more severe forms of interference with individual 
liberty; in Korematsu v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court 
notoriously declared that although the Equal Protection Clause man- 
dates strict judicial scrutiny of race-based classifications, "military ur- 
gency" nonetheless justified the internment of Japanese Americans 
during World War II.79 
For the most part, U.S. courts have responded in a similar manner 
to challenges arising out of post-9/11 government actions, although 
only a small number of cases have so far reached the courts. In ACLU 
v. United States Department of ustice, the district court upheld the Justice 
Department's refusal to grant an ACLU Freedom of Information Act 
request relating to surveillance activities authorized by the USA PA- 
TRIOT Act.80 The court acknowledged that there was no apparent 
reason (other than the government's say-so) to determine that the in- 
formation requested by the ACLU would endanger national security, 
but concluded that the public's legitimate interest in access to the in- 
formation could not "overcome the agency's expert judgment that 
withholding the disputed information is authorized by the Executive 
Order because it is reasonably connected to the protection of national 
security."81 A similar result was reached in Center for National Security 
Studies v. United States Department of Justice, in which the Court of Ap- 
peals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the government's refusal to release 
the names or other details relating to individuals detained in connec- 
tion with post-September 11 investigations, on the grounds that the 
77 Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (repealed 1948); Sedition 
Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921); see also, e.g., Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (affirming convictions under the Espionage Act, as 
amended by the Sedition Act, against First Amendment challenges); Debs v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding the Espionage Act in the face of First Amend- 
ment challenges). 
Alien Registration Act of 1940 (Smith Act), Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (re- 
pealed 1950); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596 (1952) (upholding 
the Smith Act against challenges based on the First Amendment right of association, 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the prohibition of ex post facto 
laws). 
79 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. 
O ACLU v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003). 81 Id. at 30. 
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court "owe [s] deference" to the executive branch's judgments about 
the national security reasons for withholding the information.8 
In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit likewise 
upheld the government's closure of immigration proceedings to the 
public and the media, arguing that the national security concerns 
cited by the Attorney General were "credible," although somewhat 
speculative, and declining to "conduct a judicial inquiry into the 
credibility of these security concerns," given the traditional judicial 
"deference to Executive expertise" in national security matters.83 
Similarly, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Fourth Circuit upheld the in- 
definite detention without charge of an American citizen, Yaser 
Hamdi, on the government's bare assertion that Hamdi was captured 
by Afghan Northern Alliance forces allied with the U.S., in circum- 
stances that proved him to be an "unlawful combatant."84 The Fourth 
Circuit upheld the government's refusal to allow Hamdi access to 
counsel or any mechanism to challenge the evidence on which the 
government determined that Hamdi was an unlawful combatant, cit- 
ing the Supreme Court's traditional "great deference to the political 
branches when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive mat- 
ters of foreign policy, national security, or military affairs,"85 and not- 
ing that "the executive is best prepared to exercise the military judg- 
ment attending the capture of alleged combatants."86 
The most recent Supreme Court Term suggests that U.S. courts 
will continue to struggle to determine the appropriate boundaries of 
executive power in times of conflict. On the one hand, the Supreme 
Court dealt a major blow to the Bush administration by insisting that 
"a state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to 
the rights of the nation's citizens," and declaring that Yaser Hamdi 
had to be permitted to challenge his detention.87 Similarly, in Rasul, 
the Court refused to accept the Bush administration's assertion that 
U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction to hear challenges to the detention of 
alleged enemy combatants at Guantanamo."8 On the other hand, 
82 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 331 F.3d 918, 927-28 (D.C. Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004). 
83 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002). 
84 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 341 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded 
by 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
85 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated and remanded by 
124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
86 Id. at 283. 
87 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650. 
88 See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (holding that Guantanamo detainees 
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however, the Court was unwilling to insist that U.S. citizens detained 
as suspected terrorists retain the full range of constitutional rights 
owed to criminal suspects; in Hamdi's case, the Court did not say spe- 
cifically how Hamdi should be permitted to challenge his detention, 
commenting merely that "a citizen held in the United States as an en- 
emy combatant [must] be given a meaningful opportunity to contest 
the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker,"89 
leaving open the possibility that Hamdi might be entitled only to a 
sort of "due process lite." For technical reasons, the Court also de- 
clined to decide the Padilla case on the merits, thus ducking the ques- 
tion of whether or not the President may lawfully designate a U.S. citi- 
zen an enemy combatant when the citizen was detained within the 
United States, far from a traditional field of battle.90 
In effect, just as the international law of armed conflict gives com- 
batants immunity for actions that would be unlawful in the absence of 
armed conflict, domestic U.S. jurisprudence implicitly gives the U.S. 
government immunity for many national-security-related actions that 
would most likely be considered inappropriate or even unconstitu- 
tional in the absence of a threat to national security. Of course, just as 
the law of armed conflict acknowledges that some wartime violence is 
so unjustifiable as to constitute war crimes, U.S. courts recognize, at 
least in principle, that some government actions cannot be justified 
even with the most compelling security imperatives. Courts also rec- 
ognize that some government actions undertaken in the name of na- 
tional security emergencies are not in fact justified by national security 
92 
imperatives. From time to time, such considerations have led courts 
had the right to have their habeas petitions heard in a U.S. federal district court). 89 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635. 
90 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2727 (2004) (remanding to the circuit 
court for entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice for Padilla's failure to bring 
his claims in the proper distict court). 
91 For one of the most famous statements of this principle, see Ex parte Milligan, 71 
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), in which the Court decided that military rule cannot super- 
cede civil courts in areas where civil courts and government remain open and unob- 
structed. 
92 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645-46 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that the President does not have a constitutional 
grant of exclusive power to seize persons or property because they are important to the 
military establishment). Also consider in this regard the recent collapse of many gov- 
ernment prosecutions of suspects in the "war on terror." See, e.g., Botched Terror Cases 
Are Evidence of Overzealous Prosecution, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 24, 2004, at 10A ("The col- 
lapse of the government's case in two more terrorism-related trials demonstrates again 
that forsaking civil liberties for the sake of staging high-profile show trials both weak- 
ens the fight against terror and the rights of all Americans."); see also Laura Parker, 
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to strike down national-security-related legislation or to declare cer- 
tain executive acts to be unlawful,93 just as similar considerations on 
the international level have sometimes led to the prosecution of sol- 
diers or civilian leaders for war crimes-that is, for acts of violence 
that go beyond those permitted by the law of armed conflict.94 
On the whole, however, both the international law of armed con- 
flict and domestic national security jurisprudence grant substantial 
deference to claims of "military necessity" and national security neces- 
sity, and in both the international and the domestic spheres, courts 
have generally been reluctant to declare conduct to be unlawful when 
there is any plausible claim of military or national security necessity. 
C. The Assumption of Clear Boundaries 
In the international sphere, the development of binding interna- 
tional law applicable during armed conflicts presupposes something 
so obvious that many of us rarely pause to consider it: it presupposes 
the idea that "armed conflict" is definable and identifiable, and rea- 
sonably easily distinguishable from its opposite-nonconflict, or, in 
more common parlance, peace. If it is often permissible to deliber- 
ately kill large numbers of humans in times of armed conflict, even 
though such an act would be considered mass murder in times of 
peace, then it is essential that politicians and courts be able to distin- 
guish readily between conflict and nonconflict, between war and 
peace. If we cannot make such threshold distinctions, then we have 
little coherent or consistent basis for asserting that some acts of vio- 
lence-or restrictions on rights-are appropriate and permissible, 
while others are inappropriate or illegal. 
Guantanamo "Spy Ring" Case Takes Big Hit, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2004, at Al (describing 
problems with military prosecutors' case against an alleged spy ring). 
93 See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-89 (finding that the presidential power to 
seize and possess mills could not be sustained because Congress had the exclusive con- 
stitutional authority to make all necessary laws); see also Humanitarian Law Project v. 
Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1198-1201 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (asserting that a statute 
that allows the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist or- 
ganization is vague). 
94 For documents pertaining to the Nuremberg judgments, see TRIAL OF THE 
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 
14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, at 1-42 (William S. Hein 8& Co. 1995) (1948), 
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm#proc. For a discussion 
of war crimes prosecutions arising out of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, see 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44. 
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This is as true of domestic jurisprudence on national security is- 
sues as it is of the law of armed conflict. In times of peace, our consti- 
tutional doctrines mandate transparency in government and great re- 
spect for the rights of individuals. In times of national security crisis, 
U.S. courts may permit the government to undertake actions that 
would normally be considered unlawful and even unconstitutional, 
such as trials by military tribunals that do not afford standard due 
process protections,95 or indefinite detention of U.S. citizens with only 
minimal due process.96 To a great extent, the willingness of courts to 
permit such government actions in the name of national security (and 
the willingness of American citizens to tolerate such actions) is predi- 
cated on the notion that such actions are the exception, not the 
norm; that they are allowed only during emergencies, not forever. 
Here too, a great deal thus depends on the ability of politicians, citi- 
zens, and courts to make a reasonably principled determination of 
when we face a national security crisis and when we do not. 
Drawing principled and analytically satisfying lines between war 
and peace, conflict and nonconflict, crisis and normalcy has always 
been difficult on the margins. It is clear enough, for instance, that 
World Wars I and II were international armed conflicts. Numerous 
95 SeeExparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 48 (1942) (asserting that the President of the 
United States may try German-born U.S. residents in a military tribunal without ajury). 
For an overview of military tribunals in U.S. history, see REHNQUIST, supra note 5 
(chronicling instances in U.S. history in which emergency situations have led to the 
suspension of rights); Roberto Iraola, Military Tribunals, Terrorists, and the Constitution, 
33 N.M. L. REV. 95 (2003) (discussing military tribunals in the wake of the September 
11 attacks); Carl Tobias, Detentions, Military Commissions, Terrorism, and Domestic Case 
Precedent, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1371 (2003) (examining the government's reliance on 
Quirin to litigate major terrorism cases). For a critique of the current use of military 
commissions, see Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military 
Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433 (2002) (criticizing President 
Bush's order providing for the trial before military commissions of aliens suspected of 
terrorist activities); Evan J. Wallach, Afghanistan, Quirin, and Uchiyama: Does the Sauce 
Suit the Gander?, ARMY LAW., Nov. 2003, at 18 (asserting that post-September 11 military 
tribunals violate the Third Geneva Convention (Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War)); Jim Davis, Note, A Cautionary Tale: Examining the Use of Military Tribunals by 
the United States in the Aftermath of the September 11 Attacks in Light of Peru's History of Hu- 
man Rights Abuses Resulting from Similar Measures, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 423 (2003) 
(describing Peru's violations of internationally accepted standards of due process); 
Vladeck, supra note 76 (arguing that the executive branch does not possess the type of 
inherent constitutional detention power that it has exercised in holding "enemy com- 
batants"). 
96 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated and re- 
manded by 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (holding that "the district court appointed counsel 
and ordered access to the ['enemy combatant'] detainee without adequately consider- 
ing the implications of its actions"). 
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different nation-states formally declared war on numerous other na- 
tion-states; hostilities were widespread and ongoing; and millions 
upon millions of regular, uniformed soldiers were directly involved in 
the fighting. But more sporadic hostilities between nations, insurgen- 
cies within nations, and long-term occupations of territory have never 
been as amenable to simple categorizations: Do the intermittent 
skirmishes between India and Pakistan amount to an international 
armed conflict such that the international law of armed conflict is 
triggered? Is the Irish Republican Army subject to the law of armed 
conflict, or is it merely a criminal organization subject to domestic 
criminal law, as the British government has historically insisted?97 
The law of armed conflict explicitly addresses some of these defi- 
nitional questions, although it does not resolve them. Thus, the Ge- 
neva Conventions apply expressly to "all cases of declared war or of 
any other armed conflict" that may arise between states that are par- 
ties to the Conventions, "even if the state of war is not recognized by 
one of them."98 What constitutes an "international armed conflict" is 
not otherwise defined, but the insistence on the irrelevance of decla- 
rations of war makes it clear that "armed conflict" is to be conceptual- 
ized functionally, not formalistically. The Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols distinguish, however, between 
armed conflicts that are international and those that are "internal," 
with only a small subset of the law of armed conflict applying in situa- 
tions of purely internal armed conflict."' Finally, Additional Protocol 
II also distinguishes between internal armed conflicts and mere "in- 
ternal disturbances" or "tensions," which do not trigger the applicabil- 
ity of the law of armed conflict at all, except for the core prohibitions 
contained in Common Article 300--and some commentators dispute 
even this.10' 
97 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Re-leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 446, 454 
(2003) (book review) ("The British government... has consistently maintained that 
the violence related to the crisis in Northern Ireland is criminal violence to which the 
Geneva Conventions do not apply .... "). 
98 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. at 
86. 
Only Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II 
apply to noninternational armed conflicts. Id. art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S at 
136-38; Protocol II, supra note 43, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 4. 
100 See BOUCHET-SAULNIER, supra note 50, at 109 (characterizing Common Article 
3 as applying to internal disturbances and tensions). 
'O See, e.g., John Yoo, 7Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1197 
(2004) (noting that the law of war, including Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conven- 
tions, does not apply to internal disturbances and tensions). 
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The lines between these various levels and kinds of conflict-and 
the implications of drawing these lines-have been the subject of con- 
tinuous scholarly and diplomatic debate,102 and Part III of this Article 
will discuss some of the issues and changes that have consistently ren- 
dered such line-drawing exercises problematic when it comes to the 
law of armed conflict. But these line-drawing exercises are even more 
problematic when we turn back to domestic jurisprudence on national 
security issues. The law of armed conflict offers some basic tests for 
determining the existence of armed conflict and thus the applicability 
of the law of armed conflict, although the utility of these tests has al- 
ways been contested. In domestic national security jurisprudence, 
however, there are no such tests; courts have found no principled or 
universal basis on which to determine the existence of a "threat to na- 
tional security." 
As a result, each new case requires courts to struggle all over again 
with the boundaries between "purely domestic" matters and matters 
that implicate national security and foreign affairs, and this has in- 
creased the tendency of courts to rely on congressional and/or execu- 
tive branch determinations. Even if we presume complete good faith 
on the part of the executive branch and Congress, however, these 
branches of government have been similarly unable to come up with a 
consistent and principled account of which matters implicate national 
security and which do not. 
II. CHANGES: GLOBALIZATION AND ASYMMETRICAL THREAT 
The lines between conflict and nonconflict, war and peace, crisis 
and normalcy have always been contestable-and they have always 
been contested. The analytic categories on which the law of armed 
conflict depends have been unstable since they were first developed. 
This instability has been dramatically exacerbated by recent and ac- 
celerating changes in the nature of international politics and the na- 
ture of conflict and threat, however, so much so that many of the basic 
categories are no longer analytically justifiable at all. This section out- 
lines briefly some of the background assumptions of the law of armed 
102 See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 201-02 (examining gaps and ambiguities in 
international law relevant to war crimes against humanity and genocide); Reisman 8& 
Silk, supra note 23, at 459-60 (discussing the applicability of international law to the 
Afghan conflict of the 1980s); Stewart, supra note 23, at 314 (proposing unification of 
the law of armed conflict). 
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conflict and the ways in which social, technological, and geopolitical 
change have rendered these assumptions ever more problematic. 
Although every civilization in the world has traditions (often an- 
cient traditions) governing conduct during hostilities, and although 
today most states throughout the world are parties to the Hague and 
Geneva Conventions, the modern law of armed conflict was essentially 
a creation of the West. It developed in reaction to the perceived ex- 
cesses of the American Civil War, the wars of Italian unification, the 
Crimean War, the Franco-German wars, the Boer War, and, of course, 
World Wars I and II.103 The paradigmatic "conflict" envisioned by the 
drafters of the Hague and Geneva Conventions was a war between 
sovereign nation-states, in which well-organized regular armies fought 
each other on reasonably clearly defined battlefields. As a result, the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions devoted relatively little space to 
smaller-scale, episodic, and internal armed conflicts, and many of the 
rules laid out in these conventions thus seem today like quaint relics 
of a more chivalric time.104 
Thus, for instance, one's status as a "lawful combatant" under the 
Geneva Conventions hinges, as a threshold matter, not on one's sub- 
stantive actions but on certain questions of form: whether one is un- 
der responsible command, whether one wears "a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance," and whether one carries arms openly.?10 
Similarly, the Hague and Geneva Conventions presuppose a clear dis- 
tinction between front lines and battlefields, on the one hand, and ci- 
vilian areas, on the other; and a correspondingly clear distinction be- 
tween combatants and noncombatants. Once again, this hearkens 
back to an imagined past in which wars were fought by professional 
soldiers in elaborate uniforms, clashing on vast, open fields to the 
sound of bugles and drums. 
War was never this tidy, of course; had it ever been so, the law of 
armed conflict would have been superfluous. Even at the moment of 
drafting, the Hague and Geneva Conventions were efforts to imagine 
more orderly and rational forms of bloodshed than had ever in fact 
103 See Howard, supra note 32, at 1, 10 (summarizing the circumstances leading to 
the creation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions). 
104See generally Chris afJochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A 
Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49 (1994) (arguing that interna- 
tional law has historically served to legitimate war rather than to restrict wartime vio- 
lence). 
105 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 
U.N.T.S. at 138-40; INT'L 8& OPERATIONAL AW DEP'T, supra note 43, at 12. 
2004] WAR EVER YWHERE 707 
existed, and to impose on armed conflict rules that ranged from the 
moderately aspirational to the almost impossibly so. That said, the 
rules they developed served as useful benchmarks throughout much 
of the twentieth century. They perhaps did little, overall, to restrain 
the brutality and suffering caused by armed conflicts106 (indeed, some 
commentators have suggested that they may even have legitimized 
and increased the violence of war),'?7 but they nonetheless provided 
useful political and legal benchmarks that could be used to evaluate 
state and nonstate violence,los and they also made it reasonably easy to 
distinguish between "war" and "nonwar." 
As I have said, however, the categories and boundaries created 
and presupposed by the law of armed conflict were unstable from the 
beginning,109 and as the decades have passed, they have become still 
more unstable in the face of accelerating technological and social 
changes. Technologically, the development of ever more lethal 
weapons has been a perpetual challenge to law of armed conflict pro- 
hibitions on 
"unnecessary suffering" and to the principles of propor- 
tionality and discrimination. Atomic and hydrogen bombs, for in- 
stance, are by nature indiscriminate (and many would argue that they 
are also inherently disproportionate: the damage and suffering they 
cause is so immense that they could never be appropriately used).no 
Other weapons, such as landmines, are designed to increase the safety 
106 See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for International Law from the Gulf War, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 425, 436 (1993) ("[T]here is no direct correlation between complying with inter- 
national legal rules and minimizing suffering."). 
SeeJochnick & Normand, supra note 104, at 50 ("[T]he laws of war have facili- 
tated rather than restrained wartime violence."). 
10s Thus, for instance, mainstream human rights groups such as Human Rights 
Watch, while often critical of NATO actions during the 1999 air campaign against Ser- 
bia, had little difficulty in concluding that there was "no evidence of war crimes" com- 
mitted by NATO. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR 
CAMPAIGN 3 (2000). This assessment stands in stark contrast to Human Rights Watch's 
declaration that 'Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and his inner circle of politi- 
cal and military leaders are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed in Kosovo." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, In-Depth Report Documents Milosevic 
Crimes (Oct. 26, 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/ 
kosovol026.htm. 
109 The use of aerial bombardment, the atom bomb, and widespread existence of 
resistance groups and partisans during World War II all challenged then-existing cate- 
gories, and the Geneva Conventions did not wholly resolve these challenges. 
See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 243- 
44 (July 8) (noting the "unique characteristics of nuclear weapons," their "capacity to 
cause untold human suffering and their ability to cause damage to generations to 
come"). For an interesting discussion of this issue, see generally Paul W. Kahn, Nuclear 
Weapons and the Rule of Law, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 349 (1999). 
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of those who deploy them; they allow for the destruction of the enemy 
when those who placed them are safely out of the way. For the same 
reason, of course, many mines are relatively indiscriminate; no human 
mind makes the ultimate decision about when they should be ex- 
ploded, and they kill civilian children as readily as enemy combat- 
ants."' Cluster bombs present similar problems: they are an effective 
means of killing large numbers of enemy combatants at once, but un- 
exploded bomblets can remain a hazard to civilian populations for 
months or even years.112 
As ever more sophisticated weapons have proliferated, many lethal 
weapons have become simpler, smaller, and cheaper-so simple, 
small, and cheap that even poorly organized insurgent movements 
can afford them, and younger and younger children can use them. 
Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and various shoulder-fired mis- 
siles13 allow even one or two individuals to bring down airplanes and 
launch deadly attacks on distant areas.114 Meanwhile, light and cheap 
automatic weapons such as the AK-47 can be effectively used by chil- 
dren as young as eight or nine.15 The spread of scientific knowledge 
may also make it easier and cheaper for both state and nonstate actors 
to manufacture chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and 
even Internet viruses, which have the potential to cause serious harm 
"I A global movement to ban antipersonnel mines led eventually to a widely 
signed treaty banning their use. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stock- 
piling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 
Sept. 18, 1997, art. 1(1) (a), 2056 U.N.T.S. 241, 242 (banning the use of antipersonnel 
mines). 
112 See Cluster Munitions: A Foreseeable Hazard in Iraq, Human Rights Watch (Mar. 
2003), at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/cluster031803.htm (calling for a 
moratorium on the use of cluster munitions). 
113 These missiles, known as "Man-Portable Air Defense Systems" (MANPADS), 
include models such as SA-7s, SA-14s, and S16s, the widely available Soviet equivalents 
of American "STINGER" missiles. See Arms Sale Monitoring Project: MANPADS Prolifera- 
tion, Fed. of Am. Scientists, at http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/manpads/ 
manpads.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (explaining that the Russian-made SA-7, SA- 
14, and S16 are "among the most numerous and best known" MANPADS and "similar 
in capability" to the STINGER). There are currently an estimated 500,000 MANPADS 
in the world. Id. 
14 See id. (explaining that MANPADS are "attractive to terrorists" because they are 
"lethal.... highly portable and concealable, .... inexpensive, .... relatively simple 
to 
operate,... and [a] formidable threat to unprotected aircraft"). 
5 Use of such weapons by child soldiers has been extensively documented. See, 
e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE SCARS OF DEATH: CHILDREN ABDUCTED BY THE 
LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY IN UNGANDA (1997) (recounting the experiences of child 
soldiers). 
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by disrupting vital services.116 These changes have made it harder and 
harder for states to monopolize large-scale violence, and have been a 
boon to unscrupulous terrorist and insurgent groups.117 
Other social and technological changes associated with the term 
"globalization" have also challenged state monopolization of mass vio- 
lence. It is a truism to observe that advances in transportation and 
communication technologies have made the world a smaller place: 
groups once unable to coordinate effectively even in fairly small geo- 
graphical areas can now coordinate across international borders 
cheaply and easily. Dozens of genies have been released from their 
bottles, and no one has yet found a mechanism for stopping them up 
again. With the end of the Cold War, ethnic and religious conflicts 
bubbled over from Central Europe to sub-Saharan Africa. In these 
conflicts, large segments of civilian populations at times have been 
mobilized (or intimidated) into the ranks of combatants; where the 
elimination of an entire ethnic or religious group is seen as the goal, 
traditional distinctions between combatants and noncombatants have 
had little salience. And at the same time that highly localized con- 
ceptions of identity have led to unspeakable brutality in some conflicts 
(between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, for instance, or Hutus and 
116 Thus: 
The appearance of... new concepts of weapons has gradually blurred the 
face of war. Does a single "hacker" attack count as a hostile act or not? Can 
using financial instruments to destroy a country's economy be seen as a bat- 
tle? ... Obviously, proceeding with the traditional definition of war in mind, 
there is no longer any way to answer the above questions. When we suddenly 
realize that all these non-war actions may be the new factors constituting fu- 
ture warfare, we have to come up with a new name for this new form of war: 
warfare which transcends all boundaries and limits, in short: unrestricted war- 
fare. 
QIAO & WANG, supra note 17, at 12. 
117 The military term for such new kinds of threats is "asymmetrical warfare." 
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Virtuous Warrior in a Savage World, 8 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 71, 71-72 (1997-1998). Since few states (or nonstate actors) can hope to directly 
challenge American military superiority, these actors turn increasingly to a variety of 
"strategies that seek to avoid [American] strengths .... [I]n the modern context, 
asymmetrical warfare emphasizes.., unconventional or nontraditional methodolo- 
gies." Id. at 72. Much of the time, these methodologies may involve "what might be 
characterized as 'neo-absolutist war' . . . . without rules or scruples," and focusing on 
"shattering the enemy's will by any means possible, including methods that defy recog- 
nized standards of acceptable behavior in war." Id. at 73. 
s8 Consider the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, for instance. See generally Jose E. 
Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 
(1999). 
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Tutsis in Rwanda), increasingly globalized conceptions of identity are 
proving to be equally dangerous, as the rise of al Qaeda demonstrates. 
The rise of global terrorism represents the newest and most seri- 
ous challenge to the old law of armed conflict framework."1 The Sep- 
tember 11 attacks, for example, were carried out by nineteen hijackers 
who hailed from several different countries, all of which are ostensibly 
U.S. allies.20 The hijackers had previously lived and trained in states 
as varied as Germany, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Chechnya and the U.S., 
where most of them lived openly for months or years.'1 In addition to 
the September 11 attacks, al Qaeda is credited with the 1995 bombing 
of the World Trade Center, the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, 
and with attacks on other targets from Indonesia to Turkey.22 Since 
September 11, it has become clear that al Qaeda is an equal opportu- 
nity employer when it comes to nationality and ethnicity, if not when 
it comes to gender or ideology: al Qaeda operatives have allegedly in- 
cluded native-born American citizens, as well as British, French, Aus- 
tralian, and German citizens and nationals of various Arab and Mus- 
lim states.23 Al Qaeda knows no borders, and its operatives wear no 
uniforms, operating by stealth more often than they operate openly.124 
119 The world community has consistently failed to come up with a definition of 
terrorism that all states accept as satisfactory. See Adam Roberts, Can We Define Terror- 
ism?, OXFORD TODAY (2002), http://www.oxfordtoday.ox.ac.uk/archive/0102/14_2/ 04.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) (suggesting that terrorism is easy to condemn but 
difficult to define, and "sure to remain a box with a false bottom"). 
120 See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COM- 
MISSION REPORT 1-4, 160-63, 231 (2004) (reporting that the hijackers boarding flights 
on September 11, 2001 included nationals of Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates). 
121 See id. at 157, 160, 165, 224, 233, 235 (noting that three of the hijackers pur- 
sued higher education in Hamburg, Germany, plotted the attacks in Afghanistan, and 
then attended flight school in the United States and that others had been involved in 
the "ihad" in Chechnya and had received training in Afghanistan in 2000-2001). 
22 See Paul Butler, Principal Assistant Secretary of Defense, Briefing on Detainee 
Operations at Guantanamo Bay (Feb. 13, 2004) (detailing al Qaeda's extensive terror- 
ist actions throughout the world), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ 
2004/tr20040213-0443.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2004). 
123 Jose Padilla, the alleged "dirty bomb" plotter, is an American, Court: President 
Cannot Detain U.S. Citizen as Enemy Combatant, CNN.COM, Dec. 22, 2003, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/18/padilla.case/; "shoe bomber" Richard Reid 
is British, Britons Shocked by Terror Links, CNN.COM, Jan. 21, 2002, at http:// 
archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/O01/18/inv.britain.terror/index.html; and 
those held at Guantanamo represent some 32 different nations, Carol Rosenberg, 
Camp Detainees Represent 32 Nations, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 21, 2002, available at 
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/2713066.htm?1 c8&lc. 
124 See Secretary of State Donald M. Rumsfeld, Department of Defense News Brief- 
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And these tactics work: al Qaeda has proven capable of massive. vio- 
lence and has caused thousands of deaths.125 
III. THE BREAKDOWN OF BOUNDARIES 
These recent and continuously accelerating changes have further 
destabilized the boundaries taken for granted by the laws of armed 
conflict, and they have also further problematized the distinction in 
domestic jurisprudence between national security matters and purely 
domestic matters. This section briefly examines some of the catego- 
ries that have become most untenable as a result of the geopolitical 
changes of the last few decades, and in particular as a result of post- 
9/11 events. 
A. "International" Versus "Internal" Armed Conflicts 
As noted above, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 1977 
Additional Protocols distinguish between international armed con- 
flicts and armed conflicts "not of an international character."'26 The 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 are fully applicable only to situations of 
international armed conflict (as were the Hague Conventions before 
ing (Feb. 8, 2002) (describing al Qaeda as a "non-state, terrorist network" whose forces 
made up part of the loosely organized Taliban and noting Taliban efforts "to blend in 
with civilian non-combatants, hiding in mosques and populated areas," wearing no 
"distinctive signs, insignias, symbols, or uniforms"), available at http:// 
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02082002-0208sd.html (last visited Sept. 14, 
2004). This failure to distinguish themselves from civilians has noteworthy implica- 
tions: it is one of the primary factors the Bush administration cited in support of its 
decision to regard the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters as "unprivileged combatants" who 
could be denied protective POW status under the Third Geneva Convention. See 
Goldman & Tittemore, supra note 6, at 25-26 (describing legal arguments the Bush 
administration advanced for denying Taliban and al Qaeda fighters POW status); see 
alsoJim Garamone, Rumsfeld Explains Detainee Status, AM. FORCES PRESS ERVICE, Feb. 8, 
2002 (discussing Secretary Rumsfeld's statement on the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions to the Taliban and al Qaeda), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/feb2002/n02082002_200202086.html. 
125 Al Qaeda is, of course, only the most widely known international terrorist or- 
ganization. While few other terrorist organizations appear to have a similarly global 
reach, local and regional terrorist organizations have long had a similar capacity to 
cause harm. Most recently, for instance, Chechen terrorists took over a school in Bes- 
lan, in Russia's North Ossetian region. In the resulting siege, close to 400 civilians- 
mainly women and small children-died. Russia School Siege Tops 350, CNN.coM, Sept. 
5, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/09/04/russia.school/ 
index.html. 
26 See discussion supra Part II.C (describing the Geneva Conventions' attempt to 
define which conflicts should be subject to international law). 
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them)."7 When conflicts are purely "internal," only Article 3, which is 
common to all four Geneva Conventions, applies.128 The distinction 
between international and internal armed conflicts traditionally has 
great significance, since if a conflict is declared to be internal, it does 
not trigger the law of armed conflict except for the minimal provi- 
sions of Common Article 3: 
I. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all cir- 
cumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria 
.... 
[T]he following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and 
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. 
II. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.129 
Additional Protocol II of 1977, which has been ratified by 156 
states, 3' extends to noninternational armed conflicts some of the 
same rules applicable to international armed conflicts, largely by ex- 
panding upon the meaning of Common Article 3.'13 Nonetheless, the 
127 See Hague Convention, supra note 38, art. 2, 36 Stat. at 2290 (restricting the 
Convention provisions to conflicts between the contracting nations). 
128 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 3220-22, 
3318-20, 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32, 86, 136, 288. 
129 Id. art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-17, 3220-22, 3318-20, 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32, 86, 
136, 288. 
130 See ICRC, supra note 47 (listing all states party to the Geneva Conventions and 
their Protocols). 
131 Protocol II, supra note 43, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611 ("This Protocol... de- 
velops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions... [and] shall 
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rules applicable in international armed conflicts and in internal 
armed conflicts are far from parallel; as one commentator has noted, 
the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols contain close 
to 600 articles, but only Common Article 3 and the 28 articles of Addi- 
tional Protocol II apply to noninternational armed conflicts.132 What's 
more, several dozen nations, including the U.S., have not ratified Ad- 
ditional Protocol II (although the U.S. has agreed to be bound to 
most of it as a matter of customary international law or U.S. policy).13 
As a result, the distinction between international and internal armed 
conflict still has great significance. 
Additional Protocol II only applies, in any case, to those nonin- 
ternational 
armed conflicts ... which take place in the territory of a High Contract- 
ing Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sus- 
tained and concerted military operations and to implement this Proto- 
col.134 
This means that the Protocol does not technically apply to clashes 
between two insurgent groups, that it probably does not apply to 
clashes between insurgents and police or state-sponsored paramilitary 
groups (rather than regular military forces), and that it does not apply 
when insurgent forces have an overly decentralized command struc- 
ture or lack a territorial base. The Protocol also does not apply to 
"situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated 
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature."135 
Since the end of World War II, there have been very few "interna- 
tional armed conflicts" as defined by the Geneva Conventions.136 To a 
significant extent, the U.N. Charter structure, in conjunction with 
Cold War politics, kept states from direct conflict with one another. 
Although recent years have seen several classic examples of interna- 
tional armed conflicts (including the NATO intervention in Kosovo, 
apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Addi- 
tional . . . ."). 
132 Stewart, supra note 23, at 319-20. 
133 See INT'L & OPERATIONAL AW DEP'T, supra note 43, at 7-13 (describing those 
aspects of the Additional Protocols considered binding by the United States). 
194 Protocol II, supra note 43, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611. 
135 Id. 
136 See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3115, 3218, 
3317, 3517, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32, 86, 136, 288 (declaring that the Conventions apply to 
"all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict" between signatory states). 
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the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and, most recently, the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq),'37 the overwhelming majority of recent conflicts have not fit 
squarely either into the category of "international" armed conflict or 
"internal" armed conflict. Most notably, recent decades have wit- 
nessed two common kinds of armed conflicts that defy easy categoriza- 
tion: conflicts in which insurgent groups train and attack from across 
international borders because neighboring states are too weak to pre- 
vent their territory from being used as a base, and conflicts in which 
one or more "outside" states provide material support (weapons, fi- 
nancing, training, safe harbor, etc.) to insurgents fighting within an- 
other state, despite official denials of any involvement.1" Messy cross- 
border insurgencies and proxy wars seem more than just "internal," 
but they frequently do not trigger the full applicability of the law of 
armed conflict.'39 
The rise of globally diffuse terrorist networks poses even more of a 
conundrum. Al Qaeda is clearly not a state, much less a "High Con- 
tracting Party" to the Geneva Conventions,14 so a "conflict" between 
the U.S. and al Qaeda apparently cannot be an "international armed 
conflict" as defined by the Geneva Conventions.141 On the other 
hand, it makes no sense to conceptualize a conflict with al Qaeda as 
an "internal" armed conflict either: al Qaeda has some presence in 
the U.S., to be sure, but its permanent U.S. presence appears to be 
minimal, and it also has some presence in dozens of other states 
around the globe. It attacks U.S. interests around the globe, and the 
U.S. accordingly wishes to attack its interests around the globe. But if 
the struggle between the U.S. and al Qaeda is conceptualized as an 
armed conflict, what aspects of the law of armed conflict are applica- 
ble beyond, perhaps, the minimal rules laid out in Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions? 
137 Before that, international armed conflicts included those in Vietnam, Korea, 
and Afghanistan. 
138 
Consider, for example, the long-running Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in 
Uganda and intermittent Ugandan government support for the insurgent Sudan Peo- 
ple's Liberation Army, or the disastrous conflict in the Congo, which ultimately drew 
in nearly a dozen African states, some covertly, some overtly. 
139 But see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 
27) (noting that involvement in an internal armed conflict by another state triggers 
the rules governing international armed conflicts). 
140 Until recently al Qaeda clearly operated in Afghanistan with the blessing of the 
Taliban, Afghanistan's de facto government, but the Taliban can no longer make any 
claim to statehood itself. 
141 See supra note 136 (concerning Common Article 2). 
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B. Crime Versus Conflict 
This raises a related question: on what basis can we differentiate 
between those acts of violence that are best conceptualized as "crimes" 
(subject to criminal law), and those acts of violence best conceptual- 
ized as "armed conflicts" (subject to the law of armed conflict)?142 Al- 
though the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols do not 
provide an obvious answer to this question, they take it for granted 
that not every act of violence should be construed as part of an armed 
conflict. Article 1.2 of Additional Protocol II states that the Protocol 
"shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances, and tensions 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a 
similar nature, as not being armed conflicts."'14 If these are clearly not 
armed conflicts, the implication is that the law of armed conflict is not 
triggered, and that states should deal with these threats through their 
own domestic criminal law,'44 supplemented if necessary by bilateral 
and multilateral international cooperation agreements. Since "iso- 
lated and sporadic acts of violence" are not armed conflicts, there can 
be no combatant immunity for the perpetrators, who are therefore 
subject to subsequent trial and punishment for their conduct.145 
Protocol II does not expressly exclude from consideration clashes 
inside a state. Article 1.1 states that the Protocol applies to armed 
conflicts between two or more insurgent groups, or clashes between 
state military forces and insurgent groups that are not "organized" 
and "under responsible command," or that do not "exercise such con- 
trol over a part of [the state's] territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol."'46 By negative implication, however, such clashes too seem 
to be left to domestic criminal law rather than to the international law 
of armed conflict. (This, indeed, is what the U.S. government did in 
the case of the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma 
142 See Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 308-09 (2003) (characterizing the dichotomy of the war on 
terrorism as both a law enforcement and a military problem). 
143 Protocol II, supra note 43, art. 1.2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611. 
144 See O'Connell, supra note 97, 454 ("The British government, for example, has 
consistently maintained that the violence related to the crisis in Northern Ireland is 
criminal violence to which the Geneva Conventions do not apply ... "). 
145 See Emanuel Gross, Trying Terrorists-Justification for Differing Trial Rules: The 
Balance Between Security Considerations and Human Rights, 13 IND. INT'L &c COMP. L. REV. 
1, 97 (2002) (arguing that it is a democratic state's responsibility to guarantee public 
safety by giving terrorists a fair trial and thereby only convicting the guilty). 
Protocol II, supra note 43, art. 1.1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611. 
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City, which killed 168 people. The main perpetrators, Timothy 
McVeigh and Terry Nichols, were charged with ordinary domestic 
crimes and tried by ordinary civilian courts; no U.S. government offi- 
cials seriously considered applying the law of armed conflict to the 
bombing, instead of domestic criminal law.)147 
How, then, should the U.S. struggle against al Qaeda be concep- 
tualized? As noted in the previous sections, it does not appear to be a 
classic "international armed conflict" as defined by the Geneva Con- 
ventions, but it can hardly be said to be a classic "internal armed con- 
flict" either. Al Qaeda holds no U.S. territory and operates around 
the globe. Is the struggle between the U.S. and al Qaeda in fact an 
armed conflict at all? 
In the wake of September 11, many commentators, especially in 
the human rights law community, insisted that the phrase "the war on 
terrorism" should be construed only metaphorically, arguing that the 
September 11 attacks were not part of an "armed conflict" but were 
simply a crime, albeit a crime of colossal magnitude. Since the con- 
flict with al Qaeda could neither be conceptualized as "international" 
nor "internal," these commentators argued, it had to be the case that 
it was not an armed conflict at all.4"" Although al Qaeda is interna- 
147 Notably, McVeigh himself-a U.S. Army veteran decorated for combat bravery 
in the Gulf War-sought to claim, in effect, that he was a combatant, describing deaths 
of children as "collateral damage." FBI: McVeigh Knew Children Would Be Killed in OKC 
Blast, CNN.COM, Mar. 29, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/U.S./03/29/ 
mcveigh.book.01 /index.html. 
SeeJoan Fitzpatrick, Agora: Military Commissions: Jurisdiction of Military Commis- 
sions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 347 (2002) (arguing 
that the phrase "war on terrorism" is ambiguous and "exceeds accepted definitions of 
international armed conflict"); Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality and the Rule of 
Law, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303 (2002) (arguing that the Bush admini- 
stration has pursued "a highly problematic armed conflict alternative to the criminal 
law paradigm, which is readily available to combat terrorist acts and threats"); see also 
Michael Howard, What's in a Name?: How to Fight Terrorism, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 
2002, at 8 (arguing that the use of the phrase "war on terrorism" is both "dangerous" 
and "counterproductive" because "it arouses an immediate expectation, and demand, 
for specific military action against some easily identifiable adversary"); Alain Pellet, No, 
This Is Not War! (Oct. 3, 2001), at http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-pellet.html (as- 
serting that the September 11 attacks were not war crimes and "should lead to the 
rapid adoption of new instruments designed to address the new threats looming over 
the world"). For a more nuanced version of this argument, see Mark A. Drumbl, Vic- 
timhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Aysmmetries of the Inter- 
national Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002), which argues that "there are [impor- 
tant] consequentialist, communitarian, and deontological reasons why the [9/11] 
attacks [and terrorism in general] should be constructed as criminal attacks." But see 
DerekJinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (2003) (argu- 
ing that the events of 9/11 were an armed conflict governed by the rule applicable to 
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tionalized, it is not a state. In any case, al Qaeda's attacks were rela- 
tively isolated and sporadic; al Qaeda holds no defined territory and 
controls no population. Thus, the argument was that al Qaeda was 
best analogized to global organized crime networks, such as networks 
of weapons or drug traffickers. Addressing such global criminal net- 
works requires creativity and international cooperation; it requires the 
use of domestic criminal law and other domestic and international le- 
gal tools as well, such as multilateral agreements to freeze assets of in- 
ternational criminal enterprises-but it does not require (and is not 
subject to) the international law of armed conflict. 
The response from the Bush administration was that although 
such an approach might suffice to combat organized crime, global 
terrorism is a different sort of animal and the "war on terror" is no 
mere metaphor.149 Global drug trafficking networks and other inter- 
national criminal enterprises occasionally carry out murders, and they 
do great social harm, but the violence and harm caused by al Qaeda 
are of a different order. The September 11 attacks were intended to 
cause mass death, and they did cause mass death. Al Qaeda leaders 
have stated that they regard themselves as "at war" with the United 
States,'50 and that they intend to continue to plan attacks against U.S. 
noninternational armed conflicts). Jinks argues, however, that not all terrorism should 
be considered part of an armed conflict. Id. 
149 See, e.g., Spencer Hsu & Dana Milbank, Kerry Rips Cheney Statement, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 9, 2004, at A06 (quoting Vice President Dick Cheney as criticizing Kerry for his 
allegedly "pre-9/11 mind-set," characterized by considering that "these terrorist attacks 
are just criminal acts and that we're not really at war"); see also Michael Chertoff, Law, 
Loyalty, and Terror: Our Legal Response to the Post-9/11 World, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 1, 
2003, at 15 (observing that, with a goal of destroying the United States and a willing- 
ness to employ weapons of mass destruction to achieve that end, al Qaeda represented 
"as serious a threat to the national security of the United States as one could envi- 
sion"); Butler, supra note 122 (quoting the November 2001 remarks of President 
George W. Bush, including that "[i]nternational terrorists have carried out attacks on 
the United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the 
use of United States armed forces"); News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, DOD 
Responds to ABA Enemy Combatant Report (Oct. 2, 2002) (quoting U.S. Department 
of Defense General Counsel William Haynes as stating, "the United States is currently 
in a state of war with al Qaeda, one that triggers executive branch authority to prevent 
further attacks"), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2002/b10022002_ 
bt497-02.html; Joe Whitley, General Counsel for the Department of Homeland Secu- 
rity, Comments at the University of Virginia School of Law (Feb. 28, 2004) ("We are at 
war. The president has said we're at war, and the House and the Senate have said we're 
at war, and anyone who doesn't think this is a real war is completely out of touch.") 
(notes of comments on file with author). 
,50 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 122. Butler states: 
[I]n 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a public fatwa declaring war on the 
United States. In February 1998 he issued another public fatwa . .. in which 
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interests, including attacks aimed at civilian populations. To the Bush 
administration, although al Qaeda's attacks on America are not en- 
tirely continuous, they are also not "isolated" or "sporadic"; on the 
contrary, the September 11 attacks were part of a series of attacks that 
began with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and con- 
tinue to this day, although no attacks have been as spectacular or 
deadly as the September 11 attacks. 
Additionally, according to the Bush administration, conceptualiz- 
ing al Qaeda's attacks as mere "crimes" risks eviscerating U.S. efforts 
to prevent more attacks. If the U.S. is constrained by "ordinary" law, it 
cannot launch preemptive strikes against al Qaeda either at home or 
in other nations, but must instead wait on the slow processes of inter- 
national legal cooperation abroad, and the warrants and showings of 
probable cause at home. Such techniques may be adequate for even 
the most sinister Colombian drug gangs, but they are unlikely to have 
much effect on an organization as deadly as al Qaeda. 
How should we decide whether al Qaeda is a criminal enterprise 
or a belligerent armed force? The law of armed conflict provides no 
clear guidance, and it seems to me that the Bush administration's ar- 
guments for viewing the September 11 attacks as "armed conflict" 
are-from a legal perspective-at least as persuasive as the arguments 
for viewing the September 11 attacks as crimes. The law of armed 
conflict's line between crime and armed conflict was drawn in a dif- 
ferent era, before the internet, before cell phones, before the advent 
of mass air travel, before the end of the Cold War scattered deadly 
weapons around the globe, and before the collapse of so many weak 
governments that were once propped up by the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union. There is no longer any basis for asserting a clearly discernable 
line between crime and conflict."' Al Qaeda will not be unique; in the 
future, there will be more and more al Qaedas, organizations that 
have something in common with criminal gangs and something in 
common with armies. 
he said that it was the absolute obligation of his followers to kill Americans, ci- 
vilian or military, wherever they could be found.... 
So the law of armed conflict governs what we're doing here. 
The text of the 1998 Fatwa is available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/ 
international/fatwa_1998.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). 
151 See, e.g., QIAO 8c WANG, supra note 17, at 222 (asserting that unrestricted "war- 
fare in the age of globalization" has essentially filled the "chasm between warfare and 
non-warfare"). 
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This is not to say that the Bush administration's decision to con- 
ceptualize the struggle against al Qaeda in terms of armed conflict was 
either inevitable or wise. It was a policy decision, and a policy decision 
that was neither mandated nor precluded by existing legal norms. 
Like any policy decision, it can be subjected to a cost-benefit analysis: 
are the potential gains of conceptualizing the "war on terror" as a lit- 
eral war worth the potential costs? But it is important to draw a dis- 
tinction between the legal arguments and the policy arguments. 
Although the policy decision to view the "war on terror" as a literal 
war is legally plausible, the potential implications of this policy deci- 
sion are staggering. If the law of armed conflict governs U.S. efforts to 
combat al Qaeda, then the government can plausibly assert that it 
should have the power to detain U.S. citizens on U.S. territory and 
hold them indefinitely and without charge, either as prisoners of war 
or as unlawful combatants. In neither case would they be entitled to 
trial in a regular court. This is the argument made by Bush admini- 
stration lawyers in the case of terror suspect Jose Padilla, who was de- 
tained in Chicago after getting off a plane from Pakistan. While the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Hamdi suggests that the Court 
considers such government assertions overreaching, the Court point- 
edly refused to decide the Padilla case on the merits, and Padilla re- 
mains in custody today, still uncharged and without having had any 
opportunity to challenge the basis for his detention.151 
For that matter, if the law of armed conflict is applicable even to 
actions taken by the United States on U.S. territory, there seems to be 
152 Of course, this is not necessarily an either/or choice: one could conceptualize 
the U.S. military actions in Afghanistan as an international armed conflict but still con- 
ceptualize support for terrorism by persons in the U.S. as crime. SeeJinks, supra note 
148, at 42-44 (arguing that, pursuant to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
individual criminal liability may be imposed on people who violate the substantive 
prohibitions of Article 3). 
153 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 
(2004). Jose Padilla was arrested in Chicago in May 2002. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2715. 
Padilla was initially held as a federal material witness whose testimony might be rele- 
vant to other terrorism-related cases. Id. Federal officials told the press that Padilla 
was in contact with al Qaeda and had planned to create a so-called "dirty bomb." Pa- 
dilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 701 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded by 124 S. Ct. at 
2711. A month after his initial detention, the President designated Padilla an "enemy 
combatant" (and presumptively an unlawful combatant). 124 S. Ct. at 2715. Padilla 
was transferred to military custody, where he has remained ever since. Id. at 2716. 
The government originally did not charge Padilla with any crime, did not permit him 
access to counsel, and did not say whether or not he would eventually face charges be- 
fore a military tribunal. 352 F.3d at 700. This case was eventually disposed of by the 
Supreme Court on jurisdictional grounds. 124 S. Ct. at 2727. 
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no legal bar to preemptive government killings of suspected al Qaeda 
operatives in the U.S. (including U.S. citizens) although such killings 
would, in peacetime, constitute extrajudicial executions.154 If such 
governmental detentions and killings are permissible, this virtually 
eliminates the rule of law as we have come to know it. 
C. Geographical Boundaries 
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, 
whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion ... 
and you allow him to make war at pleasure. ... If to-day, he 
should choose to say he thinks it necessary to invade Canada, 
to prevent the British from invading us, how could you stop 
him? You may say to him, 'I see no probability of the British 
invading us' but he will say to you 'be silent; I see it, if you 
don 't.' 
- Abraham Lincoln 55 
The "crime or conflict" question is closely related to another tradi- 
tional distinction drawn by the law of armed conflict. The traditional 
paradigm of armed conflict assumes that at any given time, it will be 
readily apparent where the armed conflict is taking place and where it 
is not. To put it another way, the traditional paradigm assumes clear 
spatial boundaries between zones of war and zones of peace. 
During World War II, for example, some states were at war, and 
others were neutral; thus, there was armed conflict in France, Ger- 
many, and Britain, but not in Switzerland. Switzerland was at peace, 
and for any of the warring parties to use military force within Switzer- 
land would have been a clear breach of international legal norms. If 
the U.S. wanted to kill a German military official who lived in Switzer- 
land, there was no legal basis for doing so, since Switzerland was not at 
war with anyone. If a German official in Switzerland committed a 
crime against an American, the only legal recourse of the U.S. gov- 
ernment would be to urge the Swiss authorities to arrest the German 
criminal, and perhaps extradite him to face trial in the U.S. Since 
Switzerland was not a party to the armed conflict occurring in much 
154 See infra text accompanying notes 158-60 (discussing the U.S. justification for 
the 2002 missile strike on a car allegedly carrying al Qaeda operatives in Yemen, which 
killed six people including a U.S. citizen). 
155 Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency Redux, WASH. POST, 
June 28, 2003, at A25. 
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of the rest of Europe, the U.S. could not legally abduct or kill a Ger- 
man national (or anyone else) inside Switzerland, regardless of any 
compelling political or military reasons for doing so." 
The distinction between zones of war and zones of peace-be- 
tween spatial areas in which the law of armed conflict governs and 
spatial areas in which "ordinary" domestic law and international 
agreements govern-is another once clear-cut distinction that no 
longer seems tenable in light of recent events.'57 This was driven 
home by the 2002 U.S. missile attack on a car thought to be carrying 
al Qaeda operatives in Yemen that killed six people, including a U.S. 
citizen. The car had apparently been monitored for some time by 
both Yemeni and American intelligence agencies, since it was thought 
to be used by al Qaeda officials. As the car drove through Yemen's 
Marib region, it was struck by a Hellfire missile fired from an un- 
manned CIA airplane, a "predator drone."'58 
The U.S. justification for the attack was again straightforward:"59 al 
Qaeda operates in numerous countries, and to effectively defend U.S. 
interests against future-and perhaps imminent-attacks, the U.S. 
may need at times to make preemptive strikes in self-defense.'60 Al 
156 History is replete with examples of successful state abductions and killings in 
other sovereign states, but it is clear that such acts violate international law, though 
their domestic legal consequences are minimal. Consider, for example, the abduction 
of Eichmann from Argentina by Israeli forces. Attorney-Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 
I.L.R. 277 (Isr. 1962); see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 
(1992) (holding that the defendant Mexican citizen's forcible abduction did not pro- 
hibit his trial in the United States for crimes committed in Mexico). But see Sosa v. Al- 
varez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (upholding the right of the defendant in United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain to sue in tort under 28 U.S.C. ? 1350 (2000), based on a lim- 
ited interpretation of the law of nations). 
157 See QIAO & WANG, supra note 17, at 8 ("[T]he battlefield will be everywhere."). 
158 CIA 'Killed al-Qaeda Suspects' in Yemen, BBC NEWS, Nov. 5, 2002, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2402479.stm. 
Straightforward, but piecemeal. The Bush administration offered only a 
piecemeal account of the Yemen strike. See, e.g., News Briefing, U.S. Department of 
Defense, (Nov. 4, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
transcripts/2002/tl 1042002tl 104sd.html) (quoting Rumsfeld as refusing to elaborate 
on any element of the Yemen attack). National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
later defended the attack, saying, "We're in a new kind of war, and we've made very 
clear that it is important that this new kind of war be fought on different battle- 
fields ... [The killing was] well within the bounds of accepted practice ... I can assure 
you that no constitutional questions are raised here." Witt, supra note 8, at 1. 
160 Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 7, at 75-76, echo the logic used by the United 
States. They argue: 
The UN Charter, in Articles 2(4) and 51, appears to contemplate such use of 
force.... Although Article 2(4) prohibits a member state from using force 
against another state, Article 51 creates an exception to that prohibition by 
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Qaeda was present in Yemen, and had previously struck a U.S. target 
in Yemen (the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemeni wa- 
ters, which killed 17 American sailors). The U.S. had evidence that al 
Qaeda operatives in Yemen were planning another attack on U.S. in- 
terests. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter declares that states have an "in- 
herent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against [them], until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security."'161 The missile 
attack on the al Qaeda suspects in Yemen was just such a permissible 
act of self-defense, allowed under both the U.N. Charter and the law 
of armed conflict. Alternatively, argued the U.S., the doctrine of pre- 
emptive self-defense is unnecessary, because the mere presence of the 
enemy-al Qaeda-in Yemen automatically rendered Yemen part of 
the conflict zone, in which the U.S. could legitimately take military ac- 
tion against enemy combatants." 
Here too, many in the human rights law and international law 
communities protested.163 Amnesty International, for example, ig- 
permitting the use of force in self-defense "if an armed attack occurs." Al- 
though it seems plausible that the Charter's drafters, in formulating that 
phrase, envisioned an attack on a state by another state, the language is not 
on its face limited to that situation. It would not be unreasonable, therefore, 
to apply the language broadly to encompass the 9/11 attacks--commandeer- 
ing passenger jetliners to serve as weapons against important U.S. commercial 
and military centers. 
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 240 (arguing that 
"[j]ust as [State A] is entitled to exercise self-defense against an armed attack by [State 
B], it is equally empowered to defend itself against armed bans operating from within 
[State B]"). 
161 U.N. CHARTER, art. 51. 
162 See Dana Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike; Action's Legality, Ef- 
fectiveness Questioned, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2002, at Al. Priest reports: 
The administration, working with the authority of a presidential finding that 
permits covert actions against Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network, 
considered al-Harithi and his traveling party a military target--'combatants' 
under international law. Officials further contend that Sunday's missile strike 
was an act of self-defense, which is also permitted under the international laws 
of war, because al-Harithi already had allegedly attacked the United States in 
October 2000 when he helped blow up the USS Cole, killing 17 sailors. Ad- 
ministration officials, intelligence operatives and military analysts, frustrated 
with the slow, torturous pace of locating and capturing individual terrorists in 
lawless areas of countries such as Yemen, praised the CIA strikes as an innova- 
tive way to get the job done. 
Id. 
1 See Witt, supra note 8, at 1 (noting the responses of Amnesty International and 
Sweden's foreign minister); see also U.S. Official Defends CIA Strike; Agencies Reportedly 
Given Broad Authority to Attack by Bush, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at A9. 
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nored the argument relating to preemptive self-defense (which has 
been widely criticized on the grounds that the use of force in self- 
defense should only be permitted to ward off an "imminent" 
threat),64 and argued simply that the laws of armed conflict were not 
applicable to the Yemeni missile strike: 
Under existing international humanitarian law, it is not possible to have 
an international armed conflict between a state on the one hand and a 
nonstate actor on the other, should the armed group not form part of 
the armed forces of a Party to the Geneva Conventions.... There is no 
armed conflict between the U.S. and Yemen, and the Yemeni Govern- 
ment clearly cooperated in the air strike. In addition, there is no inter- 
nal armed conflict between the government of Yemen (with the support 
of U.S. forces) and al-Qa'ida. Accordingly, the proper standards applica- 
ble to this situation were law enforcement standards .... 
If law enforcement standards, rather the law of armed conflict, 
controlled, then the missile strike takes on a different and more sinis- 
ter character. As Amnesty International put it, "if the attack was a de- 
liberate killing, in lieu of arrest, in circumstances in which the men 
did not pose an immediate threat, the killings would amount to extra- 
judicial executions in violation of international human rights law."'66 
Presumably, such extrajudicial killings would also violate Yemeni law, 
and they would certainly violate U.S. law, particularly with regard to 
the U.S. citizen who was killed in the attack. As suggested in the pre- 
vious section, it goes without saying that in normal times, the U.S. 
164 See, e.g., Lawyers' Comm. for Nuclear Pol'y Inc., The United Nations Charter and 
the Use of Force Against Iraq, at http://www.lcnp.org/global/Iraqstatemt.3.pdf (citing 
Daniel Webster's statement that self-defense is justified only when the threat is "instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation"); see 
also DINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 177-245 (discussing the use of self-defense after an 
"armed attack"); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir 
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (arguing that the use of force in self-defense is justi- 
fied under international law when "an armed attack is launched, or is immediately threat- 
ened, against a state's territory or forces (and probably its nationals); there is an urgent 
necessity for defensive action against that attack; there is no practicable alternative to ac- 
tion in self-defence ... " (emphasis added)); Drumbl, supra note 148, at 27-28 (discuss- 
ing the requirement of an "armed attack"). 
165 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 14, at 23. This sentiment was echoed by others such 
as Swedish foreign minister, Anna Lindh, who called the Yemen attack "a summary 
execution." Witt, supra note 8, at 1. 
1 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 14, at 21; see also O'Connell, supra note 97, at 454-55 
(calling the strike "an extrajudicial execution prohibited by the International Cove- 
nant on Civil and Political Rights"); Thomas Haidon, The CIA's Yemen Operation: A Le- 
gal Critique, COUNTERPUNCH, Nov. 19, 2002, http://www.counterpunch.org/ 
haidonl 119.html (arguing that the U.S. attack in Yemen was illegal). 
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government's executive branch cannot kill a criminal suspect in lieu 
of arresting and trying her. 
Here again, I think there is no single "legal" answer. The ap- 
proach taken by Amnesty International rests on a traditional, if for- 
malistic, reading of the law of armed conflict; the approach of the 
U.S. also rests on a plausible, if flexible, reading of the law of armed 
conflict6"' and the U.N. Charter.68 The policy choice made by the 
Bush administration can nonetheless be questioned and criticized, 
however, for just as the breakdown of the boundaries between crime 
and conflict has potentially staggering implications, so too does the 
breakdown of the spatial boundaries between zones of conflict and 
zones of peace. If there is no place on earth where the U.S. cannot 
legitimately use military force at any time, without warning, other 
states will claim the same rights, and we risk an escalating spiral of un- 
constrained violence-precisely what the creators of the U.N. Charter 
system sought to avoid. 
167 Unlike Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch took this position, ex- 
pressing concern about the Yemen attack and its implications, but acknowledging that 
the Bush administration's assertions about the applicability of the laws of armed con- 
flict represented an "arguably appropriate use of war rules." See Kenneth Roth, Draw- 
ing the Line: War Rules and Law Enforcement Rules in the Fight Against Terrorism, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2004 177, 183, available at http://hrw.org/wr2k4/ 
9.htm#_Toc58744958. 
168 As Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz put it in an interview with CNN, 
when asked about other "fronts" in the war on terror: "[W]e've seen a problem in 
Yemen just now. But it is a huge mistake to think that this is a problem that is isolated 
to one or two principal fronts, or one or two principal countries. It's a global problem. 
And... you need to go after it everywhere .... " Interview with Paul Wolfowitz, Dep- 
uty Secretary of Defense, CNN (Nov. 5, 2002) (transcript available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t 11052002_tl 105cnn.html). 
169 When terrorist suspects are captured far from any traditional "field of battle," 
somewhat similar problems are raised. In the wake of the abu Ghraib prison scandal, 
attention has been drawn not only to the so-called "ghost detainees" held in Iraqi pris- 
ons at the request of the CIA, but also to the several dozen terror suspects thought to 
be in CIA detention at secret locations around the globe. See The United States "Disap- 
peared" the CIA's Long-Term "Ghost Detainees," Human Rights Watch (Oct. 2004), at 5-6, 
available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/us1004/index.htm. Little is 
known about most of these detainees, other than that they exist; many were apparently 
captured in covert actions in countries with which the United States is at peace, such as 
Pakistan. Id. at 8. It is difficult to know which legal regime should govern the treat- 
ment of these detainees, since we know neither where they were captured nor where 
they are held. Here too, it is conceivable that the Bush administration could make a 
legal case for their ongoing detention (although not for their reportedly inhumane 
interrogation, which sources say involves methods such as almost drowning suspects to 
make them talk). Id. at 7. But once again, the idea that suspects can be detained in- 
definitely in undisclosed locations with no judicial or other oversight runs counter to 
core principles of the rule of law. 
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As suggested in the previous section's discussion of the breakdown 
of the boundary between crime and conflict, this breakdown of spatial 
boundaries also has potentially breathtaking domestic consequences. 
If the mere presence of a suspected al Qaeda operative is sufficient to 
render any place a zone of armed conflict, in which the law of armed 
conflict trumps other legal regimes, what legal principles would pre- 
vent the U.S. government from preemptively killing-on U.S. terri- 
tory-?any U.S. citizen suspected of aiding al Qaeda? 
D. War Without End: Temporal Boundaries 
Only the dead have seen the end of war. 
- Douglas MacArthur, May 12, 1962.170 
The lamps are going out all over Europe: we shall not 
see them lit again in our lifetime. 
- Edward Grey, Aug. 3, 1914.'71 
The laws of armed conflict traditionally conceptualize conflict as 
bounded temporally as well as spatially. Spatially, there were zones of 
war, in which the laws of armed conflict applied, and zones of peace, 
in which ordinary domestic law and international law applied. Tem- 
porally, the laws of armed conflict draw a sharp distinction between 
armed conflict on the one hand, and the "cessation of hostilities"- 
peace-on the other hand. This distinction reflects customary under- 
standing: wars are exceptional events, not the norm; they have a be- 
ginning and an end. Some are quite short (the Six-Day War between 
Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, for example), and others are rela- 
tively long (World War II lasted for six years in Europe).' But in the 
traditional paradigm, war is clearly defined, marked by the formal sur- 
170 General Douglas MacArthur, Farewell Speech to the Cadets at West Point (May 
12, 1962), in A SOLDIER SPEAKS 357 (Major Vorin E. Whan, Jr. ed., 1965) (ostensibly 
quoting Plato), available at http://www.usconstitution.com/DouglasMacArthur's 
FarewellSpeech.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
Sir Edward Grey made this famous remark on the eve of Britain's declaration of 
war against Germany and the beginning of World War I. THE COLUMBIA WORLD OF 
QUOTATIONS (Robert Andrews et al. eds., 1996), available at http://www.bartleby.com/ 
66/82/26082.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
172 I am not counting the Thirty Years' War or the Hundred Years' War, because 
each took place prior to the development of the modern law of armed conflict, and 
because these appellations are mainly metaphorical descriptions used by historians, 
and are not literal descriptions. 
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render of the defeated parties or by an armistice or other peace 
agreement. Thus, we celebrate "V.E. Day" or "Armistice Day" to me- 
morialize the end of hostilities. While, as a practical matter, hostilities 
sometimes continue for a short time after the "end" of a war (in 
World War II, some isolated groups of soldiers did not receive word of 
the war's end until weeks or even months later, and therefore kept 
fighting even after the formal end of the war),"1 as a legal matter, wars 
end when the opposing parties formally agree to stop fighting. 
Here again, the "war on terrorism" renders the traditional tempo- 
ral distinctions between war and peace less salient. It is not simply 
that we do not know when the war on terror will end; no one, during a 
war, can ever say with certainty just when the war will end, and prewar 
prognostications are often badly off-base. It is that by its nature, the 
war on terrorism is unlikely ever to end. Since the enemy in the war 
on terrorism is shadowy and shifting, and since it seems overwhelm- 
ingly likely that the U.S. will face terrorist threats for decades to come, 
even if all currently living al Qaeda members are apprehended or 
killed, there is no obvious point at which the U.S. will be able to de- 
clare victory and end the conflict. For that matter, since al Qaeda is 
not a state, it is not obvious that al Qaeda can formally surrender or 
enter into a peace agreement. And since we apparently lack any 
means of formal communication with al Qaeda's leadership--assum- 
ing al Qaeda even has a command hierarchy similar to that of a state 
or regular army--there is no clear way to negotiate with al Qaeda even 
if we wanted to do so. What this means is that we today face the literal 
prospect of war without end. 
The erosion of the temporal boundaries between war and nonwar 
has particular significance for prisoners of war and other detainees. 
Although POWs are immunized for their actions as combatants, they 
can be lawfully detained by opposing forces, and kept in detention 
until the end of the war. "[A]fter the cessation of active hostilities," 
however, the Third Geneva Convention requires that they be "re- 
leased and repatriated without delay."'74 So far, as will be discussed 
below, the U.S. has declined to grant POW status to detainees of the 
173 Consider Second Lieutenant Hiroo Onoda of the Japanese Army, who, con- 
vinced that the Second World War was not over, remained on Lubang Island in the 
Philippines awaiting the return of Japanese forces for nearly thirty years. He finally 
accepted an order to stop fighting in 1974. HIROO ONODA, NO SURRENDER: MY 
THIRTY-YEAR WAR 11-14 (Charles S. Terry trans., 1974). 
174 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3406. 
2004] WAR EVERYWHERE 727 
war on terror."75 But should the U.S. or other nations detain lawful 
enemy combatants in the course of the war on terrorism and declare 
them to be prisoners of war, they should release and repatriate these 
captives after the cessation of hostilities. If there is no point at which 
hostilities have unequivocally ceased, however, there is no point at 
which prisoners of war can expect to be released, and they might find 
themselves trapped in limbo indefinitely.'76 
In practice, this is the fate of the hundreds of detainees now held 
at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo, Cuba.'77 Although the U.S. 
government insists that the detainees are unlawful combatants rather 
than prisoners of war with combatant immunity, and that it therefore 
has the legal right to try and punish the detainees in military tribu- 
nals, it only recently initiated proceedings to try any of the detainees 
(and has announced plans to try only a tiny handful of the more than 
six hundred still detained)."" If there were any way to predict a clear 
end to the war on terrorism, the U.S. would likely either try the de- 
tainees, release them as part of some peace agreement, or some mix 
of the two.'79 As it stands, however, the indefinite nature of the con- 
flict means that these detainees may remain in detention indefinitely, 
175 But see Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (holding that federal district courts 
have the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by Guantanamo Bay detain- 
ees claiming to be held in custody in violation of the U.S. Constitution, treaties, or 
laws). 
176 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, What Is an "Unlawful Combatant, " and Why It Matters: 
The Status of Detained Al Qaeda and Taliban Fighters, FINDLAW, Jan. 23, 2002, at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020123.html (explaining that even if detainees 
were accorded prisoner of war status, they might never be entitled to release because 
the Geneva Conventions' condition of a "cessation of active hostilities" might never be 
met) (last visited Sept. 8, 2004). 
Approximately 680 detainees have been held at Guantanamo; fewer than 100 
have been released by arrangement with U.S. allies. See Vernon Loeb, U.S. to Assess De- 
tainees' Cases; Rumsfeld Says Prisoners in Cuba Will Get Annual Reviews, WASH. POST, Feb. 
15, 2004, at Al (reporting that more than 90 detainees had been repatriated or re- 
leased into foreign custody). 
The United States has now formally charged two Guantanamo detainees, who 
will be tried by military commissions. See News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, 
Two Guantanamo Detainees Charged (Feb. 24. 2004) at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
releases/2004/nr20040224-0363.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) (announcing that two 
detainees have been charged with conspiracy to commit war crimes and will be tried by 
military commission). 
179 The United States has so far released or transferred to allied states some 87 de- 
tainees. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Remarks to Greater Miami 
Chamber of Commerce (Feb. 13, 2004), at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
transcripts/2004/tr20040213-0445.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) (stating that 87 of 
the Guantanamo Bay detainees had been transferred for release and a few had already 
been returned to their home countries). 
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neither charged nor released,'18 with no access to counsel8 1 and no in- 
ternational or judicial monitoring of conditions.'"1 After several years 
of intensifying international criticism, the Defense Department re- 
cently began to provide Guantanamo detainees with "administrative 
reviews" to determine whether or not they are unlawful combatants. 
The reviews involve little process, however, and detainees are not enti- 
tled to lawyers.183 
The disintegration of the temporal boundaries distinguishing 
times of war from times of peace has other implications as well. As 
later sections of this article will discuss, there are many kinds of gov- 
180 On February 13, 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that 
an administrative review panel would be created to evaluate annually whether each 
Guantanamo detainee poses an ongoing threat. See id. (explaining the implementa- 
tion of an annual review board and outlining the review process). The Department of 
Defense initially declined to give further details, such as whether it would allow detain- 
ees counsel in conjunction with review panel hearings, when the first review panels 
would convene, who would sit on the panels, or whether there would be any appeal 
from review panel decisions. See Butler, supra note 122 (explaining that details about 
the composition and authority of the review panel were "under active consideration" 
but not yet finalized). On March 3, 2004, The Defense Department released some fur- 
ther details, but emphasized that the review process was being created "solely as a mat- 
ter of discretion," and not in acknowledgment of any legal rights of the detainees. See 
News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Announces Draft Detainee Review 
Policy (Mar. 3, 2004) (detailing in a draft memorandum the proposed administrative 
review process while emphasizing its discretionary nature), available at http:// 
www.dod.gov/releases/2004/nr20040303-0403.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2004). 
181 See generally Jesselyn A. Radack, United States Citizens Detained as "Enemy Combat- 
ants": The Right to Counsel as a Matter of Ethics, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 221 (2003) 
(analyzing the right to counsel of enemy combatants who are U.S. citizens through the 
lens of the cases regarding Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi). The Bush administration 
argued that the Guantanamo detainees had no right of access to US courts, asserting 
that US courts lack jurisdiction over Guantanamo. In Rasul v. Bush, decided in June 
2004, the Supreme Court rejected this assertion, and stated that Guantanamo detain- 
ees could bring habeas claims and various civil suits in U.S. courts. 124 S. Ct. 2686 
(2004). So far, however, the Bush administration has refused to allow most detainees 
access to counsel, rendering the Rasul decision toothless for the time being. 
182 The only monitoring so far has been done by the ICRC, which normally does 
not make its observations public and instead works privately to improve conditions if 
necessary. In this case, however, the ICRC broke with its usual traditions and publicly 
criticized the U.S. treatment of Guantanamo detainees. See Red Cross: Deteriorating 
Conditions at Cuantanamo, CNN.COM, Oct. 10, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2003/WORLD/americas/10/10/redcross.guantanamo.ap (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) 
(reporting the ICRC's vocal concern for the lack of due process accorded to detainees, 
their deteriorating health, and the Bush administration's lack of responsiveness). 
183 SeeJess Brevin, Guantanamo Defense Lawyers Are Barred from Status Hearings; Mili- 
tary Will Determine Whether the Detainees Are 'Enemy Combatants, 'WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 
2004, at A8 (reporting that the Pentagon has barred attorneys from representing pris- 
oners in their combatant hearings). 
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ernment actions, both domestic and international, that might be tol- 
erable for a finite period of time, but that would be intolerable were 
they to last forever.184 
E. We Are All at War: Distinctions Between Persons 
The war on terrorism has also eroded the already problematic dis- 
tinctions between various categories of persons. The boundary be- 
tween civilians and combatants is one of the oldest and most hallowed 
distinctions in the law of armed conflict. Although civilians can sacri- 
fice their right to the protection of the law of armed conflict by taking 
part in the hostilities (as spies, saboteurs, or partisans, for instance), 
they are normally protected in times of war. The law of armed con- 
flict prohibits the intentional targeting of civilians, and Common Arti- 
cle 3 of the Geneva Conventions implicitly makes this prohibition ap- 
plicable even to those armed conflicts "not of an international 
character": it declares that parties to the conflict must refrain from 
"violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila- 
tion, cruel treatment and torture" with regard to "persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities."'85 Failure to respect this general prohibi- 
tion against the intentional targeting of civilians constitutes a war 
crime. Depending on whether a conflict is "international" or "inter- 
nal," civilians also benefit from a range of other protections.86 
Needless to say, there have been longstanding debates about the 
definition of "civilian" and the meaning of the phrase "taking no ac- 
tive part in the hostilities." Different states have adopted slightly dif- 
ferent approaches, with the debate revolving around questions such as 
whether civilians working in munitions plants can be permissibly tar- 
geted, whether civilians working in television stations used by enemy 
184 As George Orwell wrote in his novel 1984, "[w]hen war is continuous there is 
no such thing as military necessity. Technical progress can cease and the most palpa- 
ble facts can be denied or disregarded. ... A peace that was truly permanent would be 
the same as a permanent war." GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 163-64 (Signet Classic 1992) 
(1949), quoted in Alejandra Rodriguez, Comment, Is the War on Terrorism Compromising 
Civil Liberties? A Discussion ofHamdi and Padilla, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 379, 394 (2003). 
185 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 3220-22, 
3318-20, 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34, 86-87, 135-38, 288-90. 
1s8 See Protocol II, supra note 43, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 609 (extending the protections 
of Protocol I to victims of noninternational conflicts); Protocol I, supra note 43, 1125 
U.N.T.S. at 4 (setting protocols for civilian treatment during armed conflicts); 1949 
Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, 6 U.S.T. at 3114, 3217, 3316, 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. at 
31, 85, 135, 287 (establishing baseline human rights guarantees for situations of armed 
conflict). 
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states for propaganda purposes can be targeted, whether civilian em- 
ployees of the military can be targeted, and so on. 
To some extent, commentators have also questioned the basic 
analytic assumptions embedded in the distinction between civilians 
and combatants: the distinction appears to assume that uniformed 
combatants can be targeted because their sole and inherent profes- 
sional purpose is to cause harm to the enemy, and they do in fact 
cause direct harm to the enemy, while civilians either cause no harm 
to opposing forces or cause only indirect harm. 
This distinction, too, rests on certain anachronistic assumptions 
about the nature of armed conflict. If the paradigmatic battle imag- 
ined by the framers of the Geneva Conventions was one fought by op- 
posing uniformed armies on a large plain, with civilians tucked away 
safely far behind the front lines, it made sense to posit a clear distinc- 
tion between civilians and combatants. In fact, even the battles of the 
nineteenth century rarely fit this paradigm, and modern conflict fits 
this paradigm still less well. In guerilla warfare, combatants deliber- 
ately seek to blend into the civilian population. Even in modem con- 
flicts that do not involve guerilla fighters, civilians not only produce 
the foods and supplies that keep armies going, they also create and 
maintain the technologies of war. They may vote for politicians who 
favor particular wars or wartime policies, or give money to support 
such policies. Civilian computer technicians thousands of miles away 
from battlefields may work side by side with uniformed soldiers to 
program and troubleshoot missile guidance or military communica- 
tion systems. And with modem technologies such as long-range mis- 
siles and unmanned missile-bearing planes, the distance between the 
"front" and the "rear," if such terms remain meaningful at all, may be 
half the globe. 
Furthermore, the distinction between "directly" and "indirectly" 
causing harm to an opposing party is mainly artificial. It is not obvi- 
ous that there is any moral distinction, for instance, between an avid 
civilian supporter of Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing policies 
(who voted for Milosevic and perhaps donated money to his causes) 
and a young conscript in Milosevic's army. The civilian may have 
taken active steps to further and support Milosevic's brutal policies, 
but would still be entitled to protected status under the laws of armed 
conflict. The military conscript might actively oppose Milosevic and 
seek to avoid participation in combat, but he would be a legitimate 
target of opposing forces. 
2004] WAR EVERYWHERE 731 
The war on terrorism renders the lines between civilians and 
combatants still more incoherent. Terrorists generally do not work 
for a state. Like guerilla fighters, they do not wear uniforms or openly 
acknowledge their identities, and they seek to blend in with civilian 
populations. 
Moreover, many terrorists may never play any "direct" role in at- 
tacks. Of course, Mohammed Atta and the other eighteen September 
11 hijackers clearly engaged in acts of direct violence against the 
United States, and if we use a law of armed conflict paradigm, rather 
than a criminal law paradigm, to address September 11, it would 
clearly have been lawful for the U.S. to have tried Atta for war crimes 
had he survived. Likewise, if there is an armed conflict between the 
U.S. and al Qaeda, it is lawful for the U.S. to target al Qaeda opera- 
tives actively engaged in attacks on the U.S.--in Yemen or anywhere 
else. But what about the dozens or thousands of people around the 
world who are al Qaeda sympathizers and supporters, yet have no 
formal "rank" or title, and whose support never comes close to engag- 
ing in actual violence? Is an American clerk who obtained false iden- 
tification for a September 11 hijacker a civilian, or a combatant? 
Would it matter if she was unaware of the planned attacks, but sympa- 
thized with al Qaeda's broader aims? Were the wives of the married 
September 11 hijackers civilians or combatants? Are employees of 
charitable organizations that allow some funds to be diverted to al 
Qaeda combatants or civilians? Applying the law of armed conflict to 
terrorism, there is no obvious way to decide. 
The distinction between civilians and combatants is somewhat 
analogous to another important distinction between persons: the dis- 
tinction between lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants 
are immunized for their acts of violence during the conflict, assuming 
those acts of violence otherwise comport with the law of armed con- 
flict. If captured, they must be treated as prisoners of war. They can- 
not be punished, and they must be released at the end of the conflict. 
Unlawful combatants, in contrast, are combatants who in one way or 
another violate the law of armed conflict, either by failing to comply 
with formal definitions of lawful combatants or by committing a war 
crime. If unlawful combatants are captured, they may be tried and 
punished, either by regular courts or by military tribunals.187 
1s7 For example, see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), in which the Supreme 
Court declared that a "universal agreement and practice" under "the law of war" holds 
that "[l]awful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by 
opposing military forces" and "[u]nlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture 
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Under the law of armed conflicts, to be considered "prisoners of 
war," combatants who are members of militias or other volunteer 
corps must be "commanded by a person responsible for his subordi- 
nates," have a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" (e.g, a 
uniform, banner, or other sign by which combatants can be distin- 
guished from civilians), and "[carry] arms openly," in addition to oth- 
erwise complying with "the laws and customs of war."188 The Bush 
administration has apparently interpreted this to mean that all al 
Qaeda operatives are inherently unlawful combatants, since they nei- 
ther wear uniforms nor carry arms openly.189 As a result, the Bush 
administration has refused to grant prisoner of war status to any of the 
hundreds of people currently detained at Guantanamo Bay. The 
Bush administration has also insisted that members of the Taliban 
fighting forces captured during the fighting in Afghanistan are simi- 
larly not lawful combatants, evidently on the grounds that Taliban 
fighters wore no uniforms and did not always bear arms openly.190 
and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tri- 
bunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful." Id. at 30-31. 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 
U.N.T.S. at 138-40. The Geneva Convention states that members of regular state 
armed forces are lawful combatants. Id. Even though, under Article 4, the above re- 
quirements (command by a responsible person, a fixed sign, open carrying of weap- 
ons, and compliance with the laws and customs of war) technically apply only to 
"[m]embers of other militias and members of other volunteer corps" by custom, those 
requirements apply to all combatants, including combatants with regular armies. Id.; 
see also Omar Akbar, Note, Losing Geneva in Guantanamo Bay, 89 IOWA L. REV. 195, 218 
(2003) (noting that "customary law" requires compliance with the four requirements 
of Article 4 even for members of regular armed forces). 
See Goldman & Tittemore, supra note 7, at 25; see also Lawrence Azubuike, 
Status of Taliban and al Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 127, 146- 
54 (2003) (describing the argument against extending combatant status to members of 
the Taliban and al Qaeda); U.S. Defends Handling of Afghan Captives, BBC NEWS 
ONLINE, Jan. 12, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1756643.stm 
(quoting U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld as saying the Taliban and al Qaeda captives 
will "be handled ... as unlawful combatants"); Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secre- 
tary, Press Briefing (Feb. 7, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/02/20020207-6.html ("[T]he national security team ... has always said that these 
detainees should not be treated as prisoners of war, because they don't conform to the 
requirements of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention 
.... 
."). 
190 The U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Pierre-Richard Prosper, 
has declared that the members of the Taliban "are not under a responsible command," 
that they do not "conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war," that they do not have a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable from a distance," and 
that they do not "carry arms openly." Pierre-Richard Prosper, Status and Treatment of 
Taliban and al-Qaida Detainees, Remarks at Chatham House, London, United King- 
dom (Feb. 20, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/s/wci/rm/2002/8491.htm. "Their con- 
duct and history of attacking civilian populations, disregarding human life and con- 
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The administration has also argued, with regard to both al Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees, that since neither the Taliban, as such, nor al 
Qaeda, as such, abide by "the laws and customs of war," all members 
of both groups are unlawful combatants.1 
These arguments have been challenged by a range of commenta- 
tors, from human rights groups and scholars to foreign diplomats and 
military lawyers.192 With regard to al Qaeda detainees, the administra- 
tion's case is strong, but it nevertheless seems problematic to declare, 
by fiat, that all suspected al Qaeda members are unlawful combatants. 
Hypothetically, some al Qaeda supporters might claim to have worn 
recognizable signs or to have carried arms openly, and Article 5 of the 
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War requires that "[s]hould any 
doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act 
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy ... [are lawful combat- 
ants], such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Conven- 
tion until such time as their status has been determined by a compe- 
tent tribunal."'193 However, the United States has held no Article 5 
hearings to determine the status of Guantanamo detainees.'94 
ventional norms, and promoting barbaric philosophies represents firm proof of their 
denied status." Id.; see also Diane K. Hook, Detainees or Prisoners of War?: The Applicability 
of the Geneva Convention to the War on Terrorism, 58 J. Mo. B. 346, 348-49 (2002) (assert- 
ing that the Taliban did not meet "all of the four conditions for belligerent status"), 
available at http://www.mobar.org/journal/2002/novdec/hook.htm. 191 See Azubuike, supra note 189, at 146 (quoting a U.S. ambassador on the issue of 
the Geneva Convention's criteria pertaining to "the laws and customs of war"). 
The United States initially took the position that the Geneva Conventions did not 
cover the Taliban soldiers captured in the conflict. The proffered justification was that 
"since Afghanistan was not a functioning state during the conflict and the Taliban was 
not recognized as a legitimate government, Afghanistan did not continue as a party to 
the Third Geneva Convention, which therefore could not apply to members of the 
Taliban." Id. at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted). Realizing the shaky premises 
of such a contention, the United States amended its position by asserting the more 
plausible view that since both the United States and Afghanistan were parties to the 
Geneva Conventions, and there was an armed conflict between the two, Geneva III ap- 
plied. However, it determined "that the Taliban's actions in violating the laws of war 
and closely associating itself with Al Qaeda had the effect of stripping Taliban mem- 
bers of their rights to prisoner of war status." Id. at 145 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
192 See generally Akbar, supra note 188 (providing a detailed critique of the Bush 
administration's politics toward detainees). 
193 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 5, 6 U.S.T at 3322, 75 U.N.T.S at 
140. 
194 See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 54 ("In the absence 
of individualized Article 5 hearings..,. there is genuine concern that noncombatants 
may have been caught up in the Guanttinamo net."). The failure of the United States 
to hold Article 5 hearings has been widely criticized, even by many senior military offi- 
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The administration's case for regarding Taliban detainees as per 
se unlawful combatants is weaker. The Taliban was Afghanistan's de 
facto government, and its armed forces were thus a regular army. For 
the most part, Taliban forces did carry arms openly, and while they 
wore no uniforms in the Western sense, apparently they normally 
wore distinctive black turbans.'95 The Taliban allegedly committed 
numerous violations of the laws and customs of war (for example, tar- 
geting civilians), but as the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has 
noted, "[t]he blanket labeling as 'unlawful' of an entire nation's regu- 
lar army because of a practice of even widespread war crimes is un- 
precedented."196 As with the al Qaeda detainees, the United States has 
not afforded any of the Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay Article 
5 hearings to determine their status.'97 
It should be noted that the rules for determining the lawfulness or 
unlawfulness of a combatant are themselves archaic and arguably bi- 
ased in favor of wealthier armies. The notion that "lawfulness" might 
hinge, for instance, on the wearing of "fixed distinctive signs" is odd; 
again, the classic paradigm, with its images of bugles and banners, 
does not accord well with the realities of modern conflicts, in which 
the rag-tag soldiers of third-world states and militias may simply lack 
the resources to wear anything resembling a uniform. Here, the law 
of armed conflict offers a set of chivalric rules that favors those with 
198 
more resources. 
cials. Some of the detainees will ultimately stand trial in military commissions; as of 
March 1, 2004, however, only two of the hundreds of remaining detainees had been 
charged. See News Release, supra note 178 (announcing the charges against two de- 
tainees). 
195 See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 109 n.424 (referenc- 
ing sources that describe the Taliban uniform, including black turbans). 
196 Id. at 54. 
197 Id. The recent U.S. decision to release more than eighty Guantanamo detain- 
ees appears to be a de facto acknowledgment that in some cases the administration was 
mistaken about the role the detainees had played. See Loeb, supra note 177, at A20 
(reporting that a panel would look at intelligence on the detainees before recom- 
mending whether they should be released). 
198 Interestingly, on a nonformalist reading of the Geneva Conventions, it could 
also be argued that some of the high tech weapons systems possessed by the United 
States and other wealthier nations risk turning some U.S. military personnel into "un- 
lawful combatants." The requirements that combatants have "fixed distinctive signs 
recognizable at a distance" and that they "carry arms openly" were presumably in- 
tended both to clearly distinguish combatants from civilians and to eliminate "treach- 
erous killings." Could the U.S. personnel who program and control unmanned air- 
crafts, such as the predator drone that fired Hellfire missiles to kill al Qaeda suspects 
in Yemen, be considered lawful combatants? See, e.g., Jack Kelley, U.S. Kills al-Qaeda 
Suspects in Yemen, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2002, at 1A (reporting the November 2002 assas- 
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In the war against terrorism, the U.S. has so far insisted that it 
recognizes no lawful enemy combatants at all.'99 This position also has 
troubling and far-reaching implications. The U.S. government has 
detained U.S. citizens as "unlawful combatants,",200 and it has also de- 
tained foreign children as young as thirteen at Guantanamo.201 The 
refusal of the U.S. government to place limits on the categories of 
people who may be detained indefinitely-without being charged and 
without any of the protections accorded either to POWs or to criminal 
defendants-is worrisome, particularly in the absence of clear spatial 
or temporal limits to the war on terror.202 
The increasing blurriness of the distinction between lawful and 
unlawful combatants has also created a slippery slope problem. The 
Bush administration has used the genuine ambiguity about what rules 
should govern which persons to assert that there is also ambiguity over 
whether detainees can subjected to interrogation methods such as 
hooding, sleep deprivation, use of dogs, sensory deprivation, nudity, 
and the placement of prisoners in painful positions for extended pe- 
sination of wanted al Qaeda operative Ali Qaed Sinan al-Harth and five associates by 
the CIA). (In fact, the aircraft was apparently operated by the CIA, but even if oper- 
ated by the military, the same question might be asked.) Id. 
199 Under intense pressure, the Pentagon grudgingly agreed that the Geneva Con- 
ventions apply to the conflict in Iraq-a classic international armed conflict-making 
all detainees in Iraq either POWs covered by the Third Geneva Convention or civilians 
covered by the Fourth. 200 See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at ii-iii (discussing the 
detention of Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, both U.S. citizens). See generally ABA Task 
Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants, Preliminary Report, Aug. 8, 2002, at 3 (ex- 
pressing concern about recent government actions implying that "with no meaningful 
judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be de- 
tained indefinitely without charges or counsel on the Government's say-so." (quoting 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 358 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded by 124 S. 
Ct. 2633 (2004))). 
201 On January 29, 2004, U.S. authorities released and repatriated three children, 
aged thirteen to fifteen, after holding them as enemy combatants for nearly two years; 
U.S. officials have acknowledged that other detainees aged sixteen and seventeen re- 
main in detention. News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Transfer of Juvenile 
Detainees Completed (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.dod.mil/releases/2004/ 
nr20040129-0934.html (describing the detention and release of three juveniles from 
Guantanamo); News Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Despite Releases, Children 
Still Held at Guantanamo (Jan. 29, 2004), at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/ 
2004/01/29/usint7117.htm ("The Department of Defense has confirmed that an un- 
specified number of other children, aged 16 and 17, are also detained at Guan- 
tanamo."). 
202 See generally Michael Greenberger, Is Criminal Justice a Casualty of the Bush Ad- 
ministration's "War on Terror"?, 31 HUM. RTS. 19 (2004) (describing the dangers of gov- 
ernment prosecutions that seek to fight terrorism). 
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riods. In fact, international law makes it clear that torture and cruel 
or inhumane treatment of detainees is prohibited regardless of the 
detainees' status.203 
F. The Boundaries Between National Security and Domestic Affairs 
Inter armes, silent legis. [In time of war, the law is silent]. 
- Cicero204 
If recent events have rendered less and less coherent many of the 
time-honored distinctions drawn by the law of armed conflict, they 
have had a similar impact on the customary domestic jurisprudential 
distinction between matters affecting "national security" and matters 
that are entirely domestic in nature. As discussed in Part II, U.S. 
courts have traditionally granted far greater deference to the govern- 
ment (particularly the executive branch) when national security is at 
stake. On the whole, U.S. courts have effectively accorded the gov- 
ernment something roughly analogous to "combatant immunity" 
when it comes to actions taken in furtherance of national security. 
Thus, courts have generally permitted government restrictions on in- 
dividual liberties in response to wars and other urgent threats to na- 
tional security, even when the same restrictions would not have been 
permissible absent such national security justifications. 
This judicial deference rests in part on structural assumptions de- 
rived from the Constitution. Congress and the executive are jointly 
charged with carrying out foreign and military affairs,"" and the judi- 
ciary has generally taken the view that these branches of government 
are far better placed than the judiciary to make the difficult judg- 
ments called for in "external" matters,'"2 particularly those that relate 
to national security threats (including judgments as to the very exis- 
tence of a threat). The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is there- 
fore accorded particular deference when it comes to matters affecting 
the security of the nation. 
203 See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text. 
204 Quoted in REIINQUIST, supra note 5, at 218. 
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 8 (enumerating Congress's powers); id. art. II, ? 2 (es- 
tablishing, among other powers, the President's role in foreign and military affairs). 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936) 
("The whole aim of the resolution [in question] is to affect a situation entirely external 
to the United States."). 
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The traditional judicial willingness to defer to government judg- 
ments on national security issues also derives from something else, 
however: the assumption that cases involving national security matters 
will be the exception, rather than the norm. This assumption makes 
intuitive sense. Courts always engage in balancing tests when evaluat- 
ing government incursions on individual rights, and when the gov- 
ernment interest in infringing on protected rights is particularly ur- 
gent, courts may legitimately feel that this urgency tips the balance in 
favor of the government. There are many restrictions on individual 
rights that may be necessary and tolerable on an emergency basis, 
provided that they do not go on indefinitely.207 
Like the distinctions drawn by the law of armed conflict, the dis- 
tinction between national security and internal affairs has always been 
contested. At times, courts have subjected government actions under- 
taken in the name of national security to great scrutiny and refused to 
uphold them. More often, though, the courts have deferred to the 
government, although scholars and activists have always challenged 
these court decisions. History strongly suggests, however, that def- 
erence to government claims of national security imperatives has of- 
ten led courts to uphold government actions that in hindsight ap- 
peared unjustified. Indeed, history has revealed numerous cases in 
which government officials have knowingly misrepresented the nature 
of the threat to the courts.209 
207 Especially if there is some later remedy for those whose interests were greatly 
damaged. Consider, for instance, the possibility of mandatory vaccinations-or quar- 
antines-in the event of a smallpox outbreak. 
208 
Cf Gross, supra note 66, at 1034 (discussing courts' "highly deferential attitude" 
in reviewing governmental actions and decisions in emergency situations). 
209 In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), for instance, it later became 
apparent that U.S. officials had knowingly misinformed the court about evidence relat- 
ing to the dangerousness of Japanese Americans. See Susan Kiyomi Serrano & Dale 
Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A "Constant Caution" in a Time of Crisis, 10 ASIAN 
L.J. 37, 37 (2003) ("Unearthed documents had revealed that no military necessity ex- 
isted to justify the incarceration, and that government decision makers knew this at the 
time, and later lied about it to the Supreme Court."). More recently, several Bush ad- 
ministration prosecutions of suspected terrorists have collapsed in the face of evidence 
that prosecutors exaggerated the evidence. See Botched Terror Cases Are Evidence of 
Overzealous Prosecution, supra note 92, at 10A ("In some cases, the blame lies with sloppy 
work by prosecutors. In others, the government appears to have been over-eager to 
declare it had bagged a terrorist and allowed due process to fall by the wayside."); Dan 
Eggen, Report Scolds Terrorism Prosecutors: U.S. to Drop Convictions About Trio in Detroit, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2004, at A03 ("[T]he report raises serious questions about the 
veracity of most of the key evidence and testimony at the heart of the [Detroit sleeper 
cell] case."); Parker, supra note 92, at Al ("Military prosecutors who accused an Air 
Force translator..,. of taking part in a spy ring that tried to pass more than 200 secret 
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The new U.S. "war on terrorism" is rendering judicial efforts to 
distinguish between national security cases and "ordinary" domestic 
issues ever more difficult, so much so that judicial line-drawing efforts 
appear almost completely arbitrary. If all acts of terrorism-or acts of 
support for terrorism-constitute acts of war, and if the war on terror 
has neither spatial nor temporal boundaries, then arguably almost 
anything might be said to implicate national security concerns, includ- 
ing actions that would ordinarily be construed as simple crimes. Thus, 
the government has argued that even U.S. citizens who are suspected 
of aiding al Qaeda can be detained and held indefinitely as unlawful 
enemy combatants rather than charged with a crime and offered the 
usual protections constitutionally guaranteed to all criminal suspects. 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,210 the Supreme Court struggled to address 
these arguments in the context of the detention of U.S. Citizen Yaser 
Hamdi. According to the government, Hamdi was detained by U.S. 
allies in the Northern Alliance during the war in Afghanistan and sub- 
sequently handed over to U.S. authorities.' The Department of De- 
fense designated Hamdi an "unlawful combatant," and detained him 
without charge beginning in 2001.22 In 2003, the Fourth Circuit up- 
held the government's detention of Hamdi, citing the Supreme 
Court's traditional "great deference to the political branches when 
called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign 
policy, national security, or military affairs,""• and noting that the ex- 
ecutive "is best prepared to exercise the military judgment attending 
the capture of alleged combatants."214 To the Fourth Circuit, a two- 
page affidavit from a Defense Department civilian official asserting 
that Hamdi was an unlawful combatant was deemed sufficient to jus- 
tify his indefinite detention without charge, access to counsel,"21 or any 
opportunity to challenge the government's factual assertions.216 
documents to U.S. enemies now say that only one of the documents was secret.. ."); 
Editorial, The Spies Who Weren't, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2004, at A26 ("Over the past few 
months, three espionage or security-related cases against personnel at the [Guan- 
tanamo] base have fallen apart."). 
210 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
211 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 63. 
212 Id. 
213 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated by 124 S. Ct. 2633 
(2004), remanded to 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 
278, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
2 Id. at 472 (quoting Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283). 
215 The Department of Defense subsequently decided to permit both Jose Padilla 
and Yaser Hamdi access to counsel, but in the case of both men the Defense Depart- 
ment insisted that access was being granted not as a matter of legal right but "as a mat- 
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The Supreme Court was less willing than the Fourth Circuit to de- 
fer wholly to the government, but the Justices were unable to agree on 
much beyond the notion that U.S. citizens retain at least some rights 
even in times of war. On the one hand, the Court issued a stinging 
reprimand to the Bush administration, insisting that "a state of war is 
not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the 
Nation's citizens," and declaring that Yaser Hamdi had to be permit- 
ted to challenge his detention.217 On the other hand, the Court did 
not say specifically how Hamdi should be permitted to challenge his 
detention, commenting merely that "a citizen held in the United 
States as an enemy combatant [must] be given a meaningful opportu- 
nity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral de- 
cisionmaker,"218 leaving open the possibility that Hamdi might be enti- 
tled only to a sort of "due process lite." A wide range of questions 
result: should Hamdi and others similarly situated be able to cross- 
examine witnesses and consult freely with counsel? What should be 
the standard of proof needed to hold a person as an enemy combat- 
ant? What constitutes a "neutral decisionmaker"? Would an alleged 
enemy combatant who failed to persuade a "neutral decisionmaker" of 
her innocence be entitled to appeal, and if so, to whom? Despite the 
ringing rhetoric in Justice O'Connor's majority decision, the practical 
effect of Hamdi was to toss the ball back into the executive branch's 
court, leaving the government free to decide how much due process is 
enough. 
In the related case of Jose Padilla, the Supreme Court similarly 
passed up an opportunity to decisively rein in executive power. Pa- 
dilla, like Hamdi a U.S. citizen, was arrested in Chicago in May 2002.219 
He was initially held as a federal material witness whose testimony 
might be relevant to other terrorism-related investigations.220 Federal 
officials told the press that Padilla was in contact with al Qaeda and 
ter of discretion and military authority. Such access is not required by domestic or in- 
ternational law and should not be treated as a precedent." News Release, U.S. De- 
partment of Defense, Padilla Allowed Access to Lawyer (Feb. 11, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.mil/releases/2004/nr20040211-0341.html. What's more, the U.S. 
Department of Defense refused to allow either of the two men to meet privately with 
their attorneys, insisting instead on monitoring attorney-client communications. The 
Illusion of Access, Human Rights Watch (Feb. 27, 2004), at http://www.hrw.org/ 
english/docs/2004/02/27/usdom7701 .htm. 
216 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 476. 
217 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650. 
218 Id. at 2635. 
219 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 65. 220 Id. 
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had planned to create a so-called "dirty bomb."221 A month after his 
initial detention, the President designated Padilla an "enemy combat- 
ant" (and presumptively an unlawful combatant).22 Padilla was trans- 
ferred to military custody where he has remained ever since. The 
government has not charged Padilla with any crime, has asserted that 
he has no right to counsel, and has not said whether or not Padilla will 
eventually face charges before a military commission of any sort.223 
The District Court of the Southern District of New York ordered 
the government to give Padilla access to counsel so that he could chal- 
lenge the evidence on which he had been declared an enemy combat- 
ant, although the U.S. government refused to comply with the court's 
224 
order. But the district court nevertheless accepted the govern- 
ment's argument that if a U.S. citizen is an enemy combatant, then 
she can be held indefinitely without charge.25 The court agreed that 
national security concerns merit great deference to the government's 
judgment of the appropriateness of using the "war" paradigm rather 
than the "crime" paradigm.226 Further, the court agreed that the gov- 
ernment need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Padilla 
qualifies as an enemy combatant: according to Judge Michael Mu- 
kasey, the government need only provide "some evidence" to support 
such a designation.27 
The district court's decision was reversed by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in December 2003.22" The Second Circuit refused to 
defer to the executive branch's determination that Padilla was an "en- 
emy combatant," insisting that the President has no power to declare a 
U.S. citizen an enemy combatant when the citizen was seized inside 
the U.S.229 The reach of this decision is unclear however. First, the 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
22 See id. (recounting the detention of Padilla). Ironically, Padilla and Hamdi 
have less likelihood than noncitizens of resolving their cases, since, as U.S. citizens, 
they are not eligible to be tried by a military commission. See News Release, U.S. De- 
partment of Defense, supra note 215 ("As a U.S. citizen, Padilla is not eligible for trial 
by military commission under the President's military order of Nov. 13, 2001."). 
224Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd 
sub nom. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); see also supra note 215. 
225 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 592-96. 
226 Id. at 588-90. 
227 
Id. at 570. 
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd and remanded by 124 S. Ct. 
2711 (2004). 
229 Id. at 713-18. The court also held that the Non-Detention Act of 1971, 18 
U.S.C. ? 4001(a) (2000), prohibited the detention of American citizens without ex- 
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Second Circuit noted explicitly that its holding is not necessarily in 
conflict with the Fourth Circuit decision in Hamdi, since the Fourth 
Circuit "directly predicated its holdings on the undisputed fact that 
Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in Afghanistan."230 
This limits the holding in Padilla to U.S. citizens detained on U.S. soil. 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit based its holding on the princi- 
ple that inherent executive powers do not extend to the designation of 
U.S. citizens as enemy combatants when they are captured on U.S. 
soil.231 The Second Circuit suggested, however, that Congress would 
have the power to authorize such presidential actions: "The Constitu- 
tion envisions grave national emergencies and contemplates signifi- 
cant domestic abridgements of individual liberties during such 
times .... [but] the Constitution lodges these powers with Congress, 
not the President."232 Given congressional compliance in the war on 
terror-for example the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 by 
a Senate vote of 99-1-this holding does little to limit government 
prerogatives or safeguard constitutional rights. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Padilla, but ultimately 
declined to rule on the merits, instead reversing and remanding on 
the grounds that suit had been brought in the wrong jurisdiction.233 
Logically, if Hamdi (allegedly captured on a foreign battlefield) is en- 
titled at least to an opportunity to contest his detention before a neu- 
tral decision maker, then Padilla (detained in Chicago) can surely be 
entitled to no less. The Court's unwillingness to rule on the merits in 
Padilla underscores the Court's queasiness about squarely confronting 
claims of executive power. 
The various cases arising out of Guantanamo Bay raise similar 
questions about the willingness of the judiciary to meaningfully limit 
government powers in times of national security crisis.34 In Al Odah v. 
press congressional authorization, and neither Congress's joint resolution, Authoriza- 
tion for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), nor 10 U.S.C. ? 
956(5) constituted such authorization under 18 U.S.C. ? 4001(a). Padilla, 352 F.3d at 
722-24. 
230 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 717. 
231 Id. at 717-18. 
232 Id. at 714 (citations omitted). 
233 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 
234 Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated by 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004), 
however, held that the issue of legal "sovereignty" is not controlling, and that by virtue 
of the United States' exercise of territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo, federal dis- 
trict courts had jurisdiction over an alleged enemy combatant's habeas petition. This 
position was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
Despite the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rasul, which found that U.S. courts do 
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United States,"" the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the 
government's detention of hundreds of "enemy aliens" at a U.S. mili- 
tary base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. While acknowledging the possi- 
bility that the Guantanamo detainees might not in fact qualify as "en- 
emy aliens,"'36 the D.C. Circuit dismissed the constitutional challenge 
for lack of jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit, holding that the Guan- 
tanamo military base is not on U.S. sovereign territory,237 relied on 
Johnson v. Eisentrager to assert that "constitutional rights... are not 
held by aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United States, re- 
gardless of whether they are enemy aliens."238 The Supreme Court re- 
versed the D.C. Circuit in Rasul v. Bush, but in a laconic decision that 
was strictly limited to the jurisdictional question, deferring all substan- 
have jurisdiction over Guantanamo, the Court has so far declined to order the U.S. 
government to provide the Guantanamo detainees with access to counsel. 
235 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 
(2004) (holding that no U.S. court could grant detainees at Guantanamo habeas relief 
and that the detainees also had no ability to litigate in U.S. courts). 
236 This acknowledgment rested on something of a technicality; the D.C. Circuit 
stated that the controlling precedent was Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 762 (1950), 
and in Eisentrager: 
The Court's description of the prisoners as "enemy aliens" rested instead on 
their status as nationals of a country at war with the United States.... [I]t fol- 
lows that none of the Guantanamo detainees are within the category of "en- 
emy aliens," at least as Eisentrager used the term. They are nationals of Kuwait, 
Australia, or the United Kingdom. Our war in response to the attacks of Sep- 
tember 11, 2001, obviously is not against these countries. It is against a net- 
work of terrorists operating in secret throughout the world and often hiding 
among civilian populations. An "alien friend" may become an "alien enemy" 
by taking up arms against the United States, but the cases before us were de- 
cided on the pleadings, each of which denied that the detainees had engaged 
in hostilities against America. 
Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1139-40. 
237 The court noted that "Cuba-not the United States-has sovereignty over 
Guantanamo Bay." Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1143. The D.C. Circuit relied on Cuban Am. 
Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995) and Vermilya-Brown Co. v. 
Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948), for this holding. The court noted that 
[i]n holding that a naval base in Bermuda, controlled by the United States 
under a lease with Great Britain, was outside United States sovereignty, the 
Court took notice of the lease with Cuba for the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base 
and the fact that it granted the United States "substantially the same rights as 
it has in the Bermuda lease." 
Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1143 (quoting Vermilya-Brown Co., 335 U.S. at 383). The court fur- 
ther noted that the "'determination of sovereignty over an area... is for the legisla- 
tive and executive departments.'" Id. (quoting Vermilya-Brown Co., 335 U.S. at 383). 
23 Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1140-41. The D.C. Circuit noted that in Johnson v. Eisen- 
trager, "the Supreme Court rejected the proposition 'that the Fifth Amendment confers 
rights upon all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are located and 
whatever their offenses.'" Id. at 1140 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 783). 
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tive questions about the status and treatment of the Guantanamo de- 
tainees.239 
Although rights advocates were relieved by Hamdi, Padilla, and Ra- 
sul, it remains unclear whether the Supreme Court will impose any ef- 
fective limits on government actions in the war on terror. In these 
three major cases, the Court did little to constrain executive power in 
practice. In light of past precedents, it seems unwise to predict the 
dawning of a new era of Court scrutiny of government actions under- 
taken in the name of national security. Ominously, the Court has de- 
nied certiorari in a number of other cases that raise related issues 
about the limits on government power post-9/11, including Center for 
National Security Studies v. United States Department ofJustice,240 North Jersey 
Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft,241 and M.K.B. v. Warden,242 all of which in- 
volved challenges to lower court decisions deferring to government 
judgments about the need for secrecy in connection with post-9/11 
detentions. 
The general judicial willingness to defer to the government in 
these and other recent cases has been widely criticized,243 and under- 
standably so-the implication of these decisions is that all barriers be- 
tween internal and external, international and domestic, war and 
peace, and crisis and normalcy have broken down, and even the most 
fundamental constitutional rights may be abrogated by the U.S. gov- 
ernment upon a simple claim that the law of war is applicable, rather 
than ordinary criminal and constitutional law. Nonetheless, troubling 
though this is, it cannot credibly be claimed that the judicial defer- 
ence to the government in these recent cases is either irrational or in- 
defensible (as opposed to unwise). The main problem lies not in the 
government or the judiciary's application of the relevant legal princi- 
ples. The main problem lies with the legal categories themselves. 
239 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2686. 
240 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004) (holding that 
the U.S. Department of Justice was exempted under the Freedom of Information Act's 
law enforcement exemption from having to disclose the names of detainees and their 
attorneys). 
241 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003) (holding 
that newspapers do not have a First Amendment right to access deportation hearings 
that have been determined to present significant national security concerns by the At- 
torney General). 
124 S. Ct. 1405 (2004) (denying certiorari in a case involving the press's right 
to access habeas proceedings involving the war on terror). 
243 See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: 
LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES, at ii (2003) (criti- 
cizing the lack ofjudicial review regarding the treatment of military prisoners). 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS: WAR EVERYWHERE; RIGHTS NOWHERE 
All the boundaries lying between the two worlds of war 
and non-war, of military and non-military, will be totally de- 
stroyed .... 
- Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangui, Unrestricted Warfare44 
So far, I have argued in this article that the changing nature of in- 
ternational security threats has caused the breakdown of most of the 
basic distinctions taken for granted by the laws of armed conflict and 
by that body of domestic U.S. jurisprudence that deals with national 
security issues. The changing nature of conflict and threat-in par- 
ticular the rise of global terrorism-has eroded the customary 
boundaries that separate war and peace, civilians and combatants, law- 
ful and unlawful belligerents, national security issues and domestic is- 
sues. As a result, it is becoming more and more difficult to know how 
to characterize, as a matter of law, the kinds of threats that increas- 
ingly face the U.S. and other nations, and it is therefore becoming 
harder and harder to determine the appropriate legal responses to 
these threats. The old categories have lost their analytical and moral 
underpinnings, but we have not yet found alternative paradigms to 
replace them. 
The human rights, civil rights, and international law communities 
have not squarely confronted this problem. By and large, these com- 
munities have been inclined to argue that the Bush administration is 
wrongly construing and applying the law of armed conflict: e.g., that 
the government has wrongly categorized Yemen as part of the conflict 
zone; that it has wrongly characterized the Guantanamo detainees as 
unlawful combatants rather than prisoners of war; that it has wrong- 
fully categorized the September 11 attacks as an armed conflict rather 
than a crime, and so on. This critique rests on plausible but formalis- 
tic readings of the applicable law. (And ironically, in other contexts, 
prior to September 11, these same communities have insisted on the 
importance of flexible and progressive readings of international law, 
particularly in regard to the law of armed conflict).245 
This formalist critique overlooks the fundamental underlying 
problem, however. For the most part, the problem is not that the 
244 QIAO & WANG, supra note 17, at 12. 
45 See supra note 15 (noting the human rights community's push for flexible in- 
terpretations with regard to such areas as gender-based crimes, economic and social 
rights, and children's rights). 
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Bush administration has misread or misapplied the law; in most cases, 
there is little basis for asserting this.'4 The deeper problem is that the 
Bush administration is applying a body of law that is anachronistic in 
its categories and assumptions to novel developments that were never 
even imagined by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions. These 
anachronistic categories and assumptions, applied to the struggle 
against terrorism, lead not implausibly to the conclusions the Bush 
administration has drawn. They do not compel the legal conclusions 
of the Bush administration, but neither do they offer a firm basis for 
regarding the administration's conclusions as unlawful. 
Once again, of course, to say that the administration's interpreta- 
tions of the laws of armed conflict are plausible is neither to support 
the policy decisions that underlie the choice of legal paradigms, nor 
to accept as inevitable or appropriate all of the consequences that flow 
from this choice. The human rights and civil rights law communities 
have been rightly dismayed by the consequences of the recent U.S. 
government actions that flow from the decision to conceptualize ter- 
rorism as "war" rather than "crime." In effect, the decision to make 
use of legal paradigms relating to armed conflict have brought us into 
the era of "war everywhere," and rather than a war to end all wars, we 
are now in a war without end. But because the traditional distinctions 
drawn by the law of armed conflict lose their analytic force when ap- 
plied to the "war on terror," we are also in a war where, more or less, 
anything goes. 
If the war knows no geographical or temporal boundaries, if no 
one deemed an enemy enjoys any of the protections envisioned by the 
law of armed conflict, and if the line between terrorist combatants and 
terrorist civilians makes no sense, then there are very few legal con- 
straints on U.S. behavior abroad. U.S. forces can attack, capture, de- 
tain, and kill with impunity, subject, of course, to political and diplo- 
matic constraints, but virtually unfettered by legal constraints. To be 
sure, it is true that even in earlier periods, there has been no effective 
international legal enforcement mechanism able to restrain U.S. be- 
havior abroad in matters relating to national security. Nonetheless, 
the U.S. has to a significant degree internalized the law of armed con- 
flict, and willingly accepted the constraints that flow from this body of 
law.247 Now, however, the law of armed conflict appears to dictate very 
24 The one glaring example of Bush administration misreading of the law involves 
the debate about interrogation practices. See supra note 20. 
Even since 9/11, the U.S. government has consistently sought to justify its con- 
duct by reference to the law of armed conflict. From the war in Iraq to U.S. treatment 
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few constraints, either internal or external, and this has had a spillover 
effect on other areas of the law that do contain clear guidelines, such 
as prohibitions on torture. 
The erosion of traditional boundaries has left U.S. behavior 
abroad alarmingly unconstrained, and it has also left U.S. government 
behavior relatively unconstrained domestically. Faced with the per- 
petual threat of terrorism, the U.S. government has every incentive to 
restrict civil liberties at home and to treat the home front as a war 
zone when doing so suits governmental purposes. As a result, the 
government claims the right to strip even U.S. citizens of all constitu- 
tional protections on the basis of unreviewable executive branch asser- 
tions that a citizen is an "enemy combatant." With courts so far adher- 
ing, for the most part, to traditional canons of judicial deference to 
government actions undertaken in the name of national security,248 
here, too, anything goes. 
V. WHAT CAN BE DONE? HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS A 
BASIS FOR CRITIQUE 
I have argued here that the law of armed conflict is of little use in 
placing constraints on the war on terror. The law of armed conflict, 
which has long been criticized as based on unrealistic conceptions of 
conflict, has now been undermined almost completely by the rise of a 
new kind of armed conflict, which is one never envisioned by the 
drafters of the Geneva Conventions. As a result of the conundrums 
posed by the rise of global terrorism and similar asymmetrical threats, 
states such as the U.S. can technically comply with the law of armed 
conflict, while in fact evading most of the constraints that the law of 
armed conflict intended to place on states. Likewise, most of the 
rights and persons that the law of armed conflict intended to protect 
are no longer protected, since the U.S. can plausibly claim that in this 
war, which is everywhere and forever, no enemies are lawful combat- 
of Guantanamo detainees, U.S. government officials have, for the most part, taken care 
to situate U.S. actions and arguments within the standard international law discourse. 
We continue to behave as if we believe that law matters; the problem, as noted, is not 
that the United States refuses to accept the constraints of the law, but that the applica- 
ble law does not in fact provide any real constraints. 
248Although the Supreme Court's decisions in Hamdi and Rasul were widely 
viewed as setbacks to Bush administration assertions of virtually unlimited executive 
power, the decisions did not in practice go far to erode executive power. The Hamdi 
Court was only able to agree that Hamdi was entitled to argue his case before a "neu- 
tral decisionmaker," and Rasul was restricted to the jurisdictional question. Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004). 
2004] WAR EVERYWHERE 747 
ants and few people are truly civilians. Domestically, the war on terror 
gives the U.S. government virtual carte blanche to restrict even the 
most seemingly entrenched constitutional rights with, for the most 
part, judicial acquiescence. 
In the longer run, this problem can only be solved through a radi- 
cal reconceptualization of national security law and the international 
law of armed conflict. Just as the international community has come 
together in unprecedented ways to create an international landmines 
treaty, a treaty creating an international criminal court, and to modify 
the laws of armed conflict in other ways (such as through the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the In- 
volvement of Children in Armed Conflict249), so too the international 
community might be able to come together to reconsider the Geneva 
Conventions once more. 
I do not expect this to happen soon, however; the current U.S. 
administration would almost certainly be opposed to any such enter- 
prise, just as it has been opposed to the International Criminal Court 
and a range of other recent international legal innovations. What is 
more, if the U.S. nevertheless participated in such an enterprise, its 
interventions might not be for the best, from a rights perspective. In 
the shorter run, human rights and civil rights law advocates need to 
find some other alternative legal basis for critiquing U.S. actions, and 
simultaneously begin the project of reconceptualizing the law of war 
for a new era. 
It would be facile to claim that there is any obvious solution to the 
dilemmas I have outlined in this Article, which will persist for the 
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, I think that international human 
rights law may offer some partial, interim solutions, and may ulti- 
mately point the way to reinventing the law of armed conflict. 
Unlike the law of armed conflict, international human rights law 
applies to all persons at all times, regardless of nationality, status, or 
location, and for the most part, international human rights law applies 
in times of war as much as in times of peace. International human 
rights law offers basic guarantees of due process, equal protection, 
and humane treatment, and suggests an alternative framework for 
analyzing and critiquing U.S. government actions in the war on terror- 
ism. 
249 Supra note 46, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-37, 39 I.L.M. at 1285. 
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Core international human rights norms are laid out in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.250 Though it is not itself a le- 
gally binding treaty, many of the basic principles outlined in the Uni- 
versal Declaration have since been accepted as norms of customary in- 
ternational law that are binding on all states except those that have 
persistently objected.'" The U.S. and most other states are also party 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),252 
which prohibits, among other things, arbitrary deprivation of life; dis- 
crimination on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion, politi- 
cal opinion, national or social origin; the denial of equal protection of 
the law to any person; arbitrary interference with privacy, family, 
home or correspondence; arbitrary arrest or detention; denial ofjudi- 
cial review of detentions; and denial of compensation for unlawful de- 
tentions.253 
The ICCPR does permit states to derogate from some of the rights 
laid out in the treaty, but only "[i]n time of public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed."254 Any measures taken by a state in derogating from ob- 
ligations under the ICCPR must be limited to those measures "strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation," and to those measures 
that "are not inconsistent with [a state's] other obligations under in- 
ternational law" and that "do not involve discrimination solely on the 
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin."255 
Derogating states must formally declare their intention to derogate by 
"immediately inform[ing] the other States Parties to the present 
Covenant. "256 
250 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/ 
documents/ga/res/3/ares3/htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2004). 
251 See, e.g., Perry S. Smith, Speak No Evil: Apostasy, Blasphemy and Heresy in Malay- 
sian Syariah Law, 10 U.C. DAVISJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 357, 368-69 (2004) (stating that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights binds all nations not able to establish "persis- 
tent objector" status). 
252 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. art. 4, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. 255 Id. 
Id. art. 4, para. 3, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. The ICCPR states that 
[a]ny State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of deroga- 
tion shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Cove- 
nant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Na- 
tions, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by 
which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the 
same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation. 
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In any case, even in time of public emergency, the ICCPR prohib- 
its derogation from articles 6, 7, 8.1, 8.2, 11, 15, 16 and 18.257 These 
articles establish the right to life and the right to be free of arbitrary 
deprivation of life; the right to be free of torture or other cruel, in- 
human and degrading treatment; the prohibition on slavery, the pro- 
hibition against ex post facto criminal laws, the right to be treated as a 
person before the law, and the right to freedom of thought, con- 
science and religion.258 
Some of the norms articulated in the Universal Declaration, the 
ICCPR, and other human rights law treaties such as the Genocide and 
Torture Conventions259 are generally accepted as having risen to the 
status of jus cogens, "peremptory norms" of international law that are 
binding on all states at all times, and that states cannot barter away via 
treaty or other agreement.26 Although there is some disagreement 
over precisely which international human rights norms have attained 
jus cogens status, most commentators (including the drafters of the Re- 
statement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States) agree 
that at a minimum, the norms against genocide; slavery; murder and 
"disappearance" of individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; 
and systematic racial discrimination are peremptory in nature.261 
These norms are binding at all times, whether in emergency situations 
or not, and whether in armed conflicts or not. 
Thus, the U.N. Committee on Civil and Political Rights (which was 
established by the ICCPR) has observed that despite the derogations 
permitted in times of emergency by the ICCPR, "[s]tates parties may 
in no circumstances invoke [the derogation clauses] of the Covenant 
as justification for acting in violation of... peremptory norms of in- 
ternational law, for instance... through arbitrary deprivations of lib- 
erty or by deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, includ- 
ing the presumption of innocence."262 The Committee has also noted 
Id. 
257 Id. art. 4, para. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. 
258 Id. at arts. 6, 7, 8, paras. 1 & 2, 11, 15 & 16. 
259 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat- 
ment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 10, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The 
United States is a party to both of these conventions. 
20 See FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 48, ? 702 (listing the policies, which if 
instituted by a state, will deem it to have violated international law). 
261 Id. 
262 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency 
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that implicitly, "[i]n order to protect non-derogable rights, the right 
to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide with- 
out delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a 
State party's decision to derogate from the Covenant."263 
At a time when neither domestic jurisprudence nor the law of 
armed conflict appears to offer a principled and coherent basis for 
critiquing U.S. government infringements on rights resulting from the 
war on terror, these norms of international human rights law may of- 
fer a useful alternate framework.264 They provide an alternative legal 
yardstick against which we can measure the appropriateness of the in- 
definite detentions at Guantanamo, the effectively indefinite deten- 
tions of U.S. citizens such as Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi, and the 
similar detentions of numerous immigrants in the United States.m 
Thus, although the Geneva Conventions do not clearly preclude 
the indefinite detention of those who the U.S. has declared "unlawful 
(Article 4), at 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001). 
263 Id. at 6. 
264 Numerous international treaties and agreements relating to terrorism exist, but 
these address the issue only in a piecemeal fashion and none focus on the issue of bal- 
ancing the need to fight terrorism with protection of rights. See, e.g., International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10, 2000, art. 2, S. 
TREATY Doc. No. 106-49, at 4-5, 39 I.L.M. 270, 271-72 (defining when the offense of 
terrorism is committed); Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 
12, 1998, art. 2, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-6, at 4-5, 37 I.L.M. 249, 253 (defining when 
the offense of terrorist bombing is committed); Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, arts. 2-4, S. TREATY DOC. No. 
103-8, at 3-4, 30 I.L.M. 726, 727-28 (describing all necessary measures that a State Party 
must take to prohibit unmarked explosives); Convention for the Suppression of Un- 
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, art. 3, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 101-1, at 2-3, 27 I.L.M. 668, 674-75 (defining an unlawful act against the 
safety of maritime navigation); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Ma- 
terial, Mar. 3, 1980, art. 7, T.I.A.S. No. 11080, at 11, 18 I.L.M. 1422, 1425-26 (defining 
offenses regarding nuclear materials); Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 
Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 18 I.L.M. 1456 (providing definitions regarding hos- 
tage-taking and guidelines for preventing it); Convention on the Prevention and Pun- 
ishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, art. 2, 28 
U.S.T. 1975, 1978, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, 169 (defining crimes against internationally pro- 
tected persons). For a discussion of this patchwork approach to terrorism, see Laura 
A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, Inter- 
national Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002) (arguing for the 
relevance of international legal norms in the fight against terrorism and against the 
Bush administration's use of military commissions). 
265 See generally Michael Beattie & Lisa Yonka Stevens, Comment, An Open Debate on 
United States Citizens Designated as Enemy Combatants: Where Do We Go from Here?, 62 MD. 
L. REV. 975 (2003) (presenting arguments for and against executive detention of en- 
emy combatants and examining the need for Article III courts to safeguard citizenship 
rights of American detainees). 
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combatants," the indefinite and arguably arbitrary nature of the de- 
tentions,266 and the lack of any mechanism for judicial review, renders 
these detentions likely violations of jus cogens norms. Similarly, many 
of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and many executive 
branch actions would appear to run afoul of ICCPR provisions. 
It should be immediately acknowledged that international human 
rights law is no panacea in the present situation. First of all, although 
human rights law may be of great use in evaluating the lawfulness of 
detentions, international human rights law contains few norms that 
would help determine whether and when the use of military force is 
justified.27 While the law of armed conflict does not supplant interna- 
tional human rights law in times of conflict, neither can international 
human rights law displace core principles of the U.N. Charter or the 
laws of armed conflict. 
Thus, international human rights law does not provide a satisfying 
answer to the question of whether the U.S. predator drone missile at- 
tack on a car full of suspected al Qaeda operatives in Yemen was justi- 
fled.26 Human rights law forbids murder and the arbitrary depriva- 
266 The detentions have been challenged as arbitrary because the United States 
has never articulated the basis on which it decides who should be sent to Guantanamo 
and who should be detained elsewhere, released, or transferred to another state. Al- 
though the secrecy surrounding the Guantanamo detainees makes it difficult to say 
much of anything for certain, what is known about the detainee population does sug- 
gest a certain degree of arbitrariness. Some Guantanamo detainees were as young as 
thirteen; others were apparently in their nineties. Some were detained in Afghanistan, 
some in other countries. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 52- 
55 (describing the plight of Guantanamo detainees); see also Lepri, supra note 7, at 
2597-98 (concluding that detainees should have a right to counsel and fair trial, and 
that the government should be required to justify detentions by a showing of probable 
cause); Samantha A. Pitts-Kiefer, Note, Jose Padilla: Enemy Combatant or Common Crimi- 
nal?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 875, 898-904 (2003) (distinguishing Padilla from Quirin and con- 
cluding that Padilla's detention is invalid); Irma Alicia Cabrera Ramirez, Comment, 
Unequal Treatment of United States Citizens: Eroding the Constitutional Safeguards, 33 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 207, 247-50 (2003) (arguing that enemy combatants should 
have the legal rights of criminal defendants); Rodriguez, supra note 184, at 394 (de- 
claring that judicial review is required to prevent a "slippery slope" of lost liberties in 
the war on terror). 
267 Indeed, for that reason, most human rights groups refrain from taking posi- 
tions on the use of military force in the abstract, although some organizations have 
policies on humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., Ken Roth, War in Iraq: Not a Humani- 
tarian Intervention, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT (2004) (stating that Hu- 
man Rights Watch would refrain from evaluating other justifications for military ac- 
tion, but concluding that "the invasion of Iraq cannot be justified as a humanitarian 
intervention"). 
68 See. e.g., Priest, supra note 162, at Al (describing the CIA killing of a U.S. citizen 
in a country considered at peace with the United States). 
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tion of life, but the law of armed conflict permits the killing of enemy 
combatants, including surprise attacks made at moments when the 
enemy combatants are not themselves directly engaged in acts of vio- 
lence. Perhaps the most that can be said about a case such as this is 
that given the ambiguity of whether the laws of armed conflict were 
applicable, the uncertainty about the identities of some of the car's 
occupants, and the possible existence of alternative means of stopping 
the car and apprehending its occupants, human rights norms suggest 
that the U.S. should bear the burden (politically and diplomatically, if 
not legally) of making a convincing case that the killings were neither 
arbitrary nor unnecessary. 
A second problem with using international human rights law to 
address U.S. actions in the war on terror is that no international tri- 
bunal exists that can determine whether the U.S. has violated human 
rights law and can enforce judgments against the U.S.269 At the same 
time, the domestic status of international human rights law is unclear. 
While the Supreme Court has historically recognized that interna- 
tional law is part of U.S. law, a combination of limiting doctrines (in- 
cluding the "last in time" rule, and the presumption that treaties are 
not self-executing) and judicial ignorance of international law often 
means that courts will not enforce international human rights law, es- 
pecially against the U.S. government.270 
These problems are real, but I think that there is nevertheless 
value in using international human rights law as a framework for 
evaluating U.S. government actions in the war on terror. Interna- 
tional human rights law cannot fill every conceptual gap that results 
from efforts to apply the laws of armed conflict to threats such as ter- 
269 The International Court of Justice's lack of capacity to enforce its judgments 
and the optional nature of U.S. acceptance of I.C.J. jurisdiction make it an ineffective 
tribunal vis-a-vis the United States; and the United States has refused to accept the ju- 
risdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or the new International 
Criminal Court. 
270 Courts have shown more willingness to apply and enforce international human 
rights law against foreign actors, particularly in cases brought under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. ? 1350 (2000), and, more recently, under the Torture Victims 
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. ? 1350 
(2000)). See generally Ivan Poullaos, Note, The Nature of the Beast: Using the Alien Tort 
Claims Act to Combat International Human Rights Violations, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, (2002) 
(seeking to expand the legal tools available to victims of human rights abuses). The 
Court recently gave a cautious green light to the continued use of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), the Court held that "any 
claim based on the present day law of nations [must] rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable" to 
the torts recognized by the First Congress. Id. at 2761-62. 
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rorism, but something is still better than nothing. And although U.S. 
courts have mostly declined to enforce international human rights law 
directly against the U.S. government, human rights norms can and 
should still inflect the policy discourse. The law of armed conflict is 
similarly not directly enforceable in U.S. courts or in any international 
tribunals with effective jurisdiction over the U.S., but the U.S. gov- 
ernment nonetheless acknowledges the political importance of justify- 
ing U.S. actions as consistent with the law of armed conflict. 
U.S. courts have indicated a growing willingness to consider inter- 
national human rights law, at least as one of many relevant factors in 
determining the justifiability of government actions. Thus, in Atkins v. 
Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the execution of mentally 
retarded offenders to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment's pro- 
hibition on cruel and unusual punishment.27 The Court noted that 
"within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for 
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly 
disapproved."272 The Court based this observation mainly on an ami- 
cus curiae brief submitted by the European Union, which argued that 
in the European Union and in most states around the world, the prac- 
tice of executing mentally retarded offenders is considered a violation 
of international human rights norms.273 
Similarly, in Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice Ginsburg's concurrence 
noted the relevance of international human rights standards in evalu- 
ating the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action pro- 
grams. Likewise, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court concluded 
that a state law criminalizing homosexual sex between consenting 
adults violated the Fourteenth Amendment; writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy cited decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights in support of this conclusion.275 
271 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
Id. at 316 n.21. 
273 Id. (citing Brief for European Union as Amicus Curiae at 4, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
304). 
274 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Jus- 
tice Ginsburg referred in particular to the the International Convention on the Elimi- 
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (only the first of which the United States 
has ratified). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Convention on the Elimina- 
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
275 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
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Most recently, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,176 the Supreme Court 
gave a cautious green light to the continued use of 28 U.S.C. ? 1350 
(the "Alien Tort Statute") by foreign nationals seeking civil remedies 
against egregious human rights violators. The Court took a narrow 
approach to determining which human rights violations are action- 
able under ? 1350, limiting ? 1350 to claims that "rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable" to the torts recognized by the First 
Congress as violating the law of nations.2 Despite this narrow ap- 
proach, the decision in Sosa appeared to confirm that violations of 
such jus cogens norms as genocide, torture, and extrajudicial killings fit 
this standard, and thus create causes of action under the Alien Tort 
Statute. The Sosa decision makes it clear that judges may look to 
evolving international norms as they seek to delineate appropriate 
claims under ? 1350. Perhaps most intriguingly, in Rasul v. Bush,278 
announced one day prior to Sosa, the Court affirmed that the alleged 
enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo can use the federal 
courts to pursue claims under the Alien Tort Statute. Implicitly, this 
suggests that the Court is open to the possibility that foreign nationals 
detained as terror suspects could successfully bring suit against U.S. 
officials for violations of international human rights law. 
It would not be wise to assume from this that U.S. courts will, from 
now on, consistently accept the relevance of international human 
rights law when evaluating U.S. government actions. But these deci- 
sions do offer some hope that U.S. courts will be willing to take argu- 
ments based on human rights law into account if lawyers consistently 
raise these issues. Thus, for instance, litigants seeking to overcome 
the usual judicial deference to the government in matters affecting 
national security might cite jus cogens norms and the ICCPR's ap- 
proach to derogability as part of an effort to convince courts that, 
even in time of armed conflict, governments still have an international 
law obligation to respect core rights, and to ensure that derogations of 
rights, when permissible, be limited "to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation."279 
276 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). 
277 Id. at 2761. 
124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
27 This suggests a standard of review that would be roughly parallel to the U.S. 
judicial doctrine of "strict scrutiny." Based on this, some scholars have asserted that 
various U.S. actions taken post-9/11 amount to derogations (and arguably impermissi- 
ble derogations) from the ICCPR. Thus, Elizabeth Dahlstrom notes that while it might 
or might not be reasonable to characterize the 9/11 attacks as something that "threat- 
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VI. REINVENTING THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
The task of fully reconceptualizing the law of armed conflict is far 
beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, in light of core human 
rights principles, it is possible to imagine some salutary changes based 
upon the experiences of the past decades and, in particular, upon the 
lessons of the post-9/11 "war on terror." A reinvented law of armed 
conflict would have as its twin goals the preservation of life and secu- 
rity and the preservation of due process and the rule of law. 
To begin with, a modernized law of armed conflict would aban- 
don the archaic distinction between "international" and "internal" 
armed conflict and the resulting difference in the rules that apply. 
Few scholars would mourn the elimination of this distinction, which 
has long been decried as one that "frustrates the humanitarian pur- 
pose of the law of war in most of the instances in which war now oc- 
,,280 
curs. In an era in which many conflicts are not between two or 
more states, but are instead between a state and a nonstate actor, or 
between two or more nonstate actors, the old assumptions about state 
centrality no longer serve any purpose. A modernized law of armed 
ens the life of the nation," the United States has, as a threshold matter, ignored the 
ICCPR's procedural requirements governing derogation: "[A] s of December 2002, the 
United States ha[d] not announced such an intention to suspend its obligations under 
the ICCPR, as required by Article 4(3)." K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, The Executive Policy 
Toward Detention and Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 BERKELEY. J. INT'L L. 
662, 670 (2002). Similarly, the late Joan Fitzpatrick argued that many aspects of the 
Bush administration's plan to try war on terror detainees in military commissions 
amounted to impermissible derogations from U.S. obligations under the ICCPR: 
The November 13 order, in section ? 7(b) (2), includes a startling clause: 
the individual [subject to detention] shall not be privileged to seek any 
remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any 
such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any 
court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any for- 
eign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal. 
This executive claim to displace the jurisdiction of federal and state courts, 
foreign courts, and international tribunals is questionable on many grounds. 
For human rights purposes, what is most significant is that the order does not 
purport to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and fails to mention 28 U.S.C. ? 
2241. The jurisdiction of U.S. military commissions sitting inside and outside 
the United States has been subject to habeas corpus review, even where no di- 
rect judicial appeal from conviction is permitted. 
[Yet] [t]he [ICCPR] Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 
29 affirms the nonderogability of judicial proceedings to challenge the law- 
fulness of detention. 
Fitzpatrick, supra note 148, at 352 (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
Reisman & Silk, supra note 23, at 465. See generally Stewart, supra note 23 (argu- 
ing that the distinction between "international" and "internal" conflict should be 
abandoned and replaced by a single law of armed conflict). 
756 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 675 
conflict should apply to all armed conflicts, even those not currently 
covered even by Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, 
such as clashes between two insurgent groups, clashes between insur- 
gents and police or state-sponsored paramilitary groups (rather than 
regular military forces), and clashes with insurgent forces that have a 
decentralized command structure or lack a territorial base. 
The definition of "armed conflict" should also be explicitly ex- 
panded to cover the kinds of attacks that well-organized terrorist 
groups like al Qaeda can undertake. Here, of course, one immedi- 
ately encounters difficulties. Traditionally, nothing in the law of 
armed conflict applies to "situations of internal disturbances and ten- 
sions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other 
acts of a similar nature."28' This rule makes sense in principle; its in- 
tention is clearly to leave to domestic and international criminal law 
those acts of violence that fall below a certain threshold. Nevertheless, 
a new law of armed conflict should recognize that when the same or- 
ganization (state or nonstate) is behind repeated and serious acts of 
politically motivated violence282 that are nonetheless discontinuous in 
time and space, any party to the conflict may invoke the law of armed 
conflict. There is likely no way to draw a bright-line rule delineating 
how much and how often violence must occur to be sufficient, but a 
reinvented law of armed conflict might include standards and exam- 
ples to make such determinations easier. 
A new law of armed conflict would also abandon anachronistic 
definitions of presumptively "lawful" combatants. Status as a lawful 
combatant should not hinge on whether a person is "commanded by a 
person responsible for his subordinates," has a "fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance" (e.g, a uniform or other sign by which 
combatants can be visually distinguished from civilians), or whether 
281 Additional Protocol II, supra note 43, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611. 
282 When considering how to distinguish between "crime" and "conflict," some 
commentators suggest that the motivation behind violence is one relevant factor. 
Though some armed conflicts may be motivated entirely by economic aims or a desire 
for personal revenge, and some crimes may be motivated by ideology, it may make 
sense to see politically motivated violence as more typical of "conflict," with economi- 
cally motivated violence more typical of "crime." Thus one might have a default as- 
sumption that terrorism is a form of armed conflict, while the violence associated with 
international drug smuggling is a form of crime. See Roth, supra note 13, at 2 (discuss- 
ing how the Bush administration's broad concept of "war" in the "war on terrorism" 
has troubling implications for humanitarian and due process rights). Here too, how- 
ever, it would be unwise to replace the old bright-line rules with new bright-line rules 
because, empirically, terrorism and illicit economic activity are often entangled with 
one another. 
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she "carr[ies] arms openly."283 Few can meet these requirements in 
today's conflicts. Even U.S. Special Forces soldiers often wear clothing 
not readily recognizable as "uniforms,"'284 and the requirement that a 
combatant carry arms "openly" is meaningless because much killing 
takes place at a distance when weapons cannot be detected by the na- 
ked eye. The requirement of a clear command hierarchy also fails to 
take into account the decentralized nature of many modern armed 
groups. 
It would be far better to make combatant status a purely func- 
tional question, one that hinges not on technicalities, but on the de- 
gree to which a person is directly, actively, and primarily involved in 
knowingly or intentionally planning or carrying out acts of violence. 
Here, too, standards are probably more appropriate than rules. The 
goal is to differentiate, for instance, between those who are "inciden- 
tal" terrorists and those for whom terrorism is a primary goal and 
identity. Thus, it would perhaps have been appropriate to treat the 
September 11 hijackers, had any survived, as combatants, while treat- 
ing the clerks who provided false identification documents to the hi- 
jackers as criminals. 
Adopting such a functional definition of combatant would not, of 
course, require that all combatants be treated as "lawful" combatants 
entitled to immunity for their actions. An otherwise lawful combatant 
would lose her entitlement to combatant immunity by engaging in 
substantive violations of the law of armed conflict (through attacks 
that intentionally target civilian populations, or through the use of 
torture or sexual violence). This is an aspect of the law of armed con- 
flict that need not and should not change. Combatants who commit 
war crimes or crimes against humanity should be subject to trial and 
283 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 
U.N.T.S. at 138-40. The Geneva Conventions state that members of regular state 
armed forces are lawful combatants unless they fail to comply with the substantive laws 
of war, such as the prohibition on the intentional targeting of protected persons, etc. 
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S at 
136-38 (delineating acts prohibited to lawful combatants). "Members of other militias 
and members of other volunteer corps," however, are only lawful combatants if they 
meet the additional requirements of responsible command, distinctive sign, etc. But 
by custom, this is deemed to apply to all combatants, including combatants with regu- 
lar armies. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 
U.N.T.S at 138-40 (listing the requirements for considering soldiers who are not mem- 
bers of regular armed forces to be lawful combatants). 
SSee W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 
493, 496 (2003) (discussing whether U.S. forces were in violation of the laws of war for 
wearing "civilian clothing" during operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002). 
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punishment for their acts, whether in civilian courts or military com- 
missions. 
A reconceptualized law of armed conflict would also recognize the 
importance of due process in modern conflicts that have no clear spa- 
tial or temporal boundaries. The war on terrorism may well be every- 
where and forever, but this cannot become a reason to permanently 
deprive suspected terrorists of their freedom or their lives when other 
alternatives exist. Due process is not an all-or-nothing affair. Con- 
cretely, this means that regardless of the citizenship, place of deten- 
tion, or circumstances of detention, any person detained and asserted 
to be a combatant by the opposing party should have certain minimal 
due process rights, and these rights should exist regardless of whether 
military or civilian authorities exercise control over the detainee. 
These minimum process rights should include the right to an in- 
dividualized determination of combatant/noncombatant status within 
a reasonable period of time (perhaps three to six months); the right 
to assistance of counsel in such a hearing (with the understanding 
that the detaining power could require that counsel be drawn from a 
pool of attorneys with appropriate security clearances); the right to 
periodic review hearings (perhaps yearly) to assess the ongoing 
dangerousness of a detainee and the right to counsel at such hearings; 
the right to be released if a review panel determines that a detainee is 
no longer a threat; the right to a reasonably expeditious trial (whether 
in a civilian court or a fairly constituted military court) if the detaining 
power designates a detainee an "unlawful" combatant on the grounds 
that she may have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity; 
and the right to appeal any adverse decision, whether administrative 
or judicial. 
None of these due process rights need be particularly burden- 
some to a detaining power; all could be subject to ordinary "reason- 
ableness" requirements. In its recent decisions to grant limited access 
to counsel to Padilla and Hamdi,28" to release dozens of Guantanamo 
detainees,'2" to permit other detainees a periodic administrative review 
of 
"dangerousness,"'"2 and to charge some detainees with war crimes 
before military commissions,'" the U.S. has effectively acknowledged 
that providing minimal due process rights to detainees is not irrecon- 
25 News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, supra note 215. 
86 Rumsfeld, supra note 179. 
287 Id. 
SNews Release, supra note 178. 
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cilable with protecting national security interests. The U.S. has only 
made these moves grudgingly and as a matter of discretion, however. 
A reimagined law of armed conflict would grant basic due process to 
all detainees as a matter of right. 
To safeguard these rights, a new law of armed conflict should also 
require detaining powers to permit expanded monitoring of condi- 
tions and proceedings by intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations and by the press. Here too, detaining powers have a le- 
gitimate interest in safeguarding sensitive security-related information, 
but a new law of armed conflict would mandate judicial proceedings if 
necessary to determine the validity of claims regarding the need to 
limit access to detainees or information about detainees. Such pro- 
ceedings might take place in camera and might involve specially 
trained and cleared judges, but some mechanism for deciding ques- 
tions of access should be adopted. As a general principle, there 
should be no government actions that are not subject to subsequent 
judicial review, regardless of whether or not an armed conflict exists at 
the time the government actions are taken. 
There are some issues, as Part VI notes, that are not readily re- 
solved by reference to basic human rights principles, and for which it 
is difficult to come up with adequate guidelines. Issues concerning 
the initial decision to use force fall into this category. As noted previ- 
ously, the use of force itself is traditionally governed both by the law of 
armed conflict and by the U.N. Charter. Unfortunately, neither pro- 
vides clear answers to such questions as the legality of the November 
2002 U.S. missile attack on al Qaeda suspects in Yemen, which killed a 
U.S. citizen, among others. Once again, a new law of armed conflict 
would have to resort to standards rather than rules. Attacks such as 
the one in Yemen could be justified in the event that they are chal- 
lenged, but the burden should fall on the attacking power to provide 
some evidence that the targets of the attack were in fact actively en- 
gaged in planning or carrying out acts of armed conflict, and that rely- 
ing on criminal law rather than on military force to stop the planned 
violence was not a reasonable alternative.2 
These suggestions for a revamped international law of armed con- 
flict all have implications for U.S. domestic jurisprudence. This article 
28 As Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch has noted, this might well have been 
a plausible claim in the context of the 2002 Yemeni attack: "[T]he Yemeni govern- 
ment apparently lacked control over the area" in which the attack occurred, and 
"eighteen Yemeni soldiers had reportedly been killed in a prior attempt to arrest" the 
targets of the attack. Roth, supra note 11, at 242. 
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has argued that the customary U.S. judicial deference to the govern- 
ment in times of war and national security crisis provides no safe- 
guards in the context of the war on terror. Court deference to the 
executive and legislative branches in times of crisis has been previ- 
ously justified on the grounds that such deference is temporary, and 
will cease when the crisis is over. But since the war on terror is likely 
to be with us more or less forever, courts should shift from an auto- 
matic presumption of deference when national security is invoked to a 
more searching inquiry into the reasonableness of particular govern- 
ment acts. 
Once more, this is an issue of standards rather than rules. Instead 
of bright-line determinations that, for instance, government designa- 
tion of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant suffices to deprive the 
detainee of all constitutional rights, courts should instead apply a 
heightened level of judicial scrutiny to government actions, asking 
whether the transfer of a U.S. citizen to military detention is in fact 
justified under the circumstances. Such a review would inquire into 
the detainee's own links to the armed conflict (the directness and 
level of her involvement in the hostilities) and also into the feasibility 
of alternative civilian proceedings, placing the burden on the gov- 
ernment to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the na- 
tional interest would be seriously harmed by charging and trying the 
detainee for ordinary crimes in the civilian court system. 
These suggestions are necessarily preliminary in nature. The law 
of armed conflict as it currently exists is the product of decades of evo- 
lution and substantial international consensus, and this Article can do 
no more than suggest the basic outlines of a reimagined and modern- 
ized law of armed conflict. Nonetheless, although the task of recon- 
ceptualizing the law of armed conflict is a difficult one, it is not an 
impossible one, as the points outlined above suggest. 
CONCLUSION 
Many commentators have already remarked on the difficulties of 
applying the law of armed conflict to the kinds of conflict that increas- 
ingly predominate in the modern world, and many others have strug- 
gled to find principled ways of deciding how much of the law of 
armed conflict, if any, is applicable to the war on terror. The threats 
to human and civil rights that flow from the war on terror have also 
been well documented and passionately debated. But the whole of 
the discourse on these issues has somehow been less than the sum of 
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the parts. Few commentators have sought to consider all of these is- 
sues at once, and as a result the commentaries are fragmented. 
This Article seeks to put all the pieces together in a new way. I 
have suggested that although most commentators are reluctant to ac- 
cept it, we simply lack an adequate international legal paradigm for 
thinking about the changes brought about by the rise of global terror- 
ism. The analytical underpinnings of the core distinctions drawn by 
the laws of armed conflict have broken down, and as a result, this 
body of law is no longer of much practical use in allowing us to de- 
termine which rights and persons merit protection. 
The implications of this are far-reaching and troubling; we now 
face the specter of "war everywhere," and, in effect, rights nowhere, at 
least as far as the laws of armed conflict and domestic national security 
law are concerned. There is no easy solution to this problem in the 
short run, although as I have argued, international human rights law 
does fill some of the gaps and offer an alternative framework for 
evaluating the legality of the war on terror, both internationally and in 
domestic fora. 
In the longer run, we need urgently to begin to imagine what a 
new law of armed conflict might look like, and I have made some pre- 
liminary suggestions here. Although a thorough reconceptualization 
of the law of armed conflict is beyond the scope of this Article, I have 
suggested some of the kinds of safeguards that would be consistent 
both with the need to protect ourselves and others from new kinds of 
security threats and with the need to safeguard basic rights. Reinvent- 
ing the law of armed conflict in the age of terror will not be easy, but 
it is better to face the challenge directly than to pretend it does not 
exist. 
